STEPHEN J. GREGSON, APPELLANT,
v.
PAULA MARIE CHIATELLO GREGSON, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1999-08-25
No. 98-02272
ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and WHATLEY, J., Concur.
739 So. 2d 1266 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Stephen Gregson appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the trial court's division of marital assets and award of retroactive temporary alimony. The court affirms the equal division of home equity but reverses the retroactive alimony award as an improper departure from the prior judge's repeated denials and inconsistent with the brief marriage duration.


Holding

The court affirmed the award of one-half home equity because Stephen failed to prove the asset was not marital property. The court reversed the retroactive temporary alimony award because it conflicted with the prior judge's decisions, the brevity of the marriage, Paula's employability, and the settlement agreement whereby Paula accepted $7,000 in lieu of temporary support.


Headnotes

[1] A party seeking to prove an asset is not marital property bears the burden of proof.

[2] A successor judge cannot review, modify, or reverse the final orders of a predecessor on the merits and on the same facts, absent special circumstances such as mistake or…

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Key Quotes

“The general rule is that a successor judge cannot review, modify, or reverse on the merits and on the same facts the final orders of a predecessor, unless there exists some special circumstances such as mistake or fraud upon the court.”

Establishes the core principle that the trial judge violated judicial procedure by revisiting the prior judge's repeated denials of temporary alimony without special circumstances.

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Facts & Procedural History

Stephen and Paula Gregson were married on April 20, 1996, and separated on September 16, 1996—a marriage lasting less than six months. Paula sold her …

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Opinion of the Court
GREEN, Judge.

GREEN, Judge.

Stephen J. Gregson appeals the final judgment of dissolution of marriage concerning his brief marriage to Paula Marie Chiatello Gregson. The proceedings leading to the final judgment in this case were protracted and complex, in part because Mrs. Gregson was represented by a series of attorneys and in part because the case was handled by more than one circuit court judge.

Mr. Gregson raises several issues on appeal, of which we address two. We affirm the trial court’s decision to give Mrs. Gregson half of the equity in the marital home because Mr. Gregson failed to prove that the asset was not marital. We reverse the retroactive award of temporary alimony by the last circuit court judge to handle this case because the award does not comport with the brevity of the marriage, Mrs. Gregson’s employability, or the proceedings that took place before the initial trial court judge. All remaining issues are affirmed without discussion.

The parties lived together less than six months before their final separation. Stephen J. Gregson and Paula Gregson were married on April 20,1996, having previously lived together in the residence of Mrs. Gregson. Both were employed prior to marriage, and by agreement, Mrs. Greg-son terminated her employment shortly before marriage. She was previously earning approximately $30,000 per year selling medical supplies. She sold her home, netting an equity income of $10,000. The record is not entirely clear, but it would appear that her money either went into a joint account or was consumed by the parties jointly.

Mr. and Mrs. Gregson purchased a new home, titled in their joint names, which they occupied on August 4, 1996. This home was valued at $270,000 for the purpose of equitable distribution. The purchase price was substantially less. Although Mr. Gregson testified that he did not intend a gift with respect to Mrs. Gregson’s having been listed as a title owner by the entirety, we affirm the trial court’s order fixing her equal equity at $26,000. See § 61.076(3)(a)(6), Fla. Stat. (1997); Robertson v. Robertson, 598 So. 2d 491 (Fla.1991).

The trial court also awarded the wife retroactive temporary alimony in the sum of $77,000, which included a credit for $7,000 previously paid, resulting in a net obligation of $70,000, plus prejudgment interest. This sum was calculated by an award of $3,500 per month, accruing from the final separation date of September 16, 1996, to the date of entry of the final judgment on February 19, 1998. It appears that the trial judge miscalculated the number of monthly payments for this period.

Nevertheless, the award of retroactive temporary alimony was error for several reasons. First, the wife effectively contracted away the right to claim temporary alimony in lieu of a $7,000 payment received from the husband. The wife agreed to withdraw her motion for temporary support in exchange for the $7,000 amount. Second, the short duration of the marriage and the wife’s college education and employability trumped temporary support beyond the $7,000 amount. Last, the prior judge in the case had repeatedly denied continuing requests for temporary alimony. The trial judge who ordered the retroactive temporary alimony in effect acted as an appellate court. This was error. “The general rule is that a successor judge cannot review, modify, or reverse on the merits and on the same facts the final orders of a predecessor, unless there exists some special circumstances such as mistake or fraud upon the court.” Blitch v. Owens, 519 So. 2d 704, 705 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). There were no special circumstances in this case to warrant a review of the decisions of the prior judge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and WHATLEY, J., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Painter v. Painter, 823 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
    …of the litigation from April 1999, when she filed her petition, through December 2000, when the final judgment was entered. We find no error in the court’s rulings on temporary alimony. Mr. Painter contends that our decision in Gregson v. Gregson, 739 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), implies that a successor judge may not order retroactive temporary alimony payments when a predecessor judge has refused to do so. In Gregson we reversed the temporary alimony award because Mrs. Gregson had contracted away her ri…

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