T.S.D., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A 12-year-old juvenile with an IQ of 62 appeals his delinquency adjudication based on a confession he made after police read him Miranda rights. The court reversed, finding the juvenile's Miranda waiver was not knowing and intelligent because he could not comprehend the right to counsel during police questioning, despite understanding the concept of counsel in court.
The court held that T.S.D.'s Miranda waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Considering the combination of his age, intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement, the state failed to meet its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that T.S.D. knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.
[1] A juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights is invalid if the juvenile lacks the ability to comprehend the rights being waived, considering factors such as age, intelligence, e…
[2] The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a juvenile knowingly and intelligently waived their right to remain silent and their right t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The record indicates that T.S.D. recognized that he had the right to have an attorney present with him in court, but nowhere does he express the ability to fathom the concept that he was entitled, by virtue of the rights read to him, to have an attorney present with him at the time he was being questioned — the time he offered the confession.”
Establishes the critical distinction between understanding counsel at trial versus counsel during interrogation, showing lack of knowing waiver
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceT.S.D. is a 12-year-old with a history of psychological problems, an IQ of 62, and a third-grade reading level. He was read Miranda rights written at …
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SHEVIN, J.
T.S.D., a juvenile, appeals his adjudication of delinquency asserting error in the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his confession. We reverse.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, neither party’s expert testified that T.S.D. grasped the concept that his Miranda
rights included the right to have an attorney present during questioning.2 T.S.D. is twelve years old. He has a history of psychological problems, and has an IQ of 62. T.S.D. reads at a third grade level. Miranda rights are written at a sixth or seventh grade level. The record indicates that T.S.D. recognized that he had the right to have an attorney present with him in court, but nowhere does he express the ability to fathom the concept that he was entitled, by virtue of the rights read to him, to have an attorney present with him at the time he was being questioned — the time he offered the confession.
Based on these facts, T.S.D.’s argument that his Miranda waiver was not knowing and intelligent is well taken. This is not a case where, as in W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 593 So. 2d 1054 (Fla.1991), a juvenile sought to suppress a confession based on the juvenile’s young age. Here, the evidence shows that T.S.D. did not possess the ability to comprehend the rights he was waiving. Upon considering, not only T.S.D.’s age, but “a combination of that factor [and] such other circumstances as his intelligence, education, experience, and the ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement^]” W.M., 585 So. 2d at 983, it becomes clear that T.S.D.’s confession was not admissible. Contrary to the state’s assertion, the record demonstrates that T.S.D.’s prior exposure to the juvenile justice system did not aid in his comprehension of this Miranda right. Compare Kennedy v. State, 641 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 650 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 1994); W.M., 585 So. 2d at 983. The state did not “meet its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that ... [T.S.D.] knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.” Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla.1980). See e.g., Fields v. State, 402 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
The adjudication is hereby reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to enter an order suppressing the confession.
Reversed and remanded.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. Commenting on T.S.D.’s responses during his evaluation, the State's expert stated:
"A. Well, he — [T.S.D.’s] response did not indicate that he knew that an attorney could be brought in immediately. It didn’t say that he didn’t understand it, but it’s unclear.”
On cross, the state's expert testified:
"Q. So if he doesn't understand that he’s entitled to a lawyer at police questioning, you could conclude that he's still competent to waive Miranda. Isn’t that true?
A. I could, but I said I’m unclear as to what he understood. I didn't follow it up and I’m not clear as to whether he gave that response and if I had questioned him, he might have given another response or not. And I pointed out that that is an unclear — that is probably the unclear area of this examination.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Gorman Roberts, Jr. v. State, 874 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…present not only before interrogation but during interrogation as well. See Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla.1999); Sapp v. State, 690 So. 2d 581, 583-84 (Fla.1997); Holland v. State, 813 So. 2d 1007, 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); T.S.D. v. State, 741 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Statewright v. State, 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); James v. State, 223 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). Similarly, federal courts have recognized that advisement of the right to counsel during questioning is a vital part of…
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J.G. a child v. State, 883 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…otality of the factual circumstances presented to the trial court, we are constrained to conclude that the State failed to meet its heavy burden to show that Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. See T.S.D. v. State, 741 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).2 Law: Confessions “A confession is not involuntary merely because the person making it is a juvenile.” T.B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Tennell v. State, 348 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). “The errone…
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Balfour v. State, 768 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…t-to-search form to Balfour testified that Balfour signed it without any indication that he did not understand. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress and Balfour was convicted as charged. The defense relies principally on T.S.D. v. State, 741 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), which it contends is so factually similar as to be controlling here. T.S.D., however, involved a 12-year-old juvenile with a history of psychological problems. Balfour is a twenty-three-year-old adult. The principal difference, h…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1980)
- W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Fields v. State, 402 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Kennedy v. State, 641 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)