WILLIE MAE MCNEAL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Mae McNeal appeals her conviction and community control revocation, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her community control because the arrest warrant was not delivered to the sheriff's department until after her community control period had expired. The Florida District Court of Appeal agrees and reverses, holding that under State v. Boyd, a warrant is not issued until both signed by a judge and delivered to the proper executive officer.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke McNeal's community control. Under State v. Boyd, an arrest warrant is not issued for purposes of setting in motion the probation revocation process until both signed by a judge and delivered to the proper executive officer for execution. Because the warrant was not delivered until December 3, 1998, after McNeal's September 5, 1998 expiration date, the revocation was improper.
[1] A warrant is considered issued for the purpose of initiating the probation revocation process when it has been signed by a judge and delivered to the proper executive off…
[2] A statutory amendment providing that a warrant is issued at the time it is signed by a magistrate does not apply retroactively to cases predating its effective date.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an arrest warrant is not issued for purposes of setting in motion the probation revocation process until a judge has signed a warrant and the warrant has been delivered to the proper executive officer for execution”
Establishes the two-part test for warrant issuance under State v. Boyd, requiring both judicial signature and delivery to executive officer
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcNeal was sentenced to five years in prison suspended in favor of one year community control (beginning September 5, 1997, expiring September 5, 1998…
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PER CURIAM.
In this appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court’s order of revocation of community control should be vacated because, under State v. Boyd, 717 So. 2d 524 (Fla.1998), the trial court had no jurisdiction to revoke community control. We agree.
In this case, the appellant was charged with felony petit theft and sentenced to five years in prison which was suspended in favor of one year community control followed by one year probation. The one year community control was to begin on September 5, 1997, and to expire on September 5,1998. Upon affidavit of violation of community control, a warrant was signed by the circuit judge on October 3, 1997, but the warrant was not delivered to the sheriffs department for execution until December 3, 1998. Upon appellant’s admission to four violations of community control, her community control and probation were revoked and she was sentenced to three years in prison with credit for 67 days served.
In State v. Boyd, 717 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla.1998), the supreme court held that “an arrest warrant is not issued for purposes of setting in motion the probation revocation process until a judge has signed a warrant and the warrant has been delivered to the proper executive officer for execution” (emphasis added). In the 1999 legislative session, however, chapter 99-169, Laws of Florida, was passed to become effective July 1, 1999. Chapter 99-169 amends section 901.02(1), Florida Statutes (1997), to add the sentence, “A warrant is issued at the time it is signed by the magistrate.”
Although the language of the amendment itself does not indicate whether the chapter law is to be applied retroactively, the staff analysis expressly states that the amendment will affect future cases only:
The first amendment [to section 901.02] changes this result in future cases by providing that the revocation process begins when a warrant is signed by a judge. Thus, a defendant’s probation could be revoked if the judge signs the warrant before the term of probation expires even if it is not delivered to the sheriff to be executed until after the probationary period has ended.
Fla.H.R.Comm. on Law Enf. and Crime Prev., CS for SB 11 (1999) Final Analysis (June 14, 1999) (on file with comm.) (emphasis added). The change in the law set forth in chapter 99-169 did not take effect until July 1, 1999; therefore, it would not apply in the instant case (where the magis trate’s signature and the delivery to the clerk took place prior to July 1, 1999), but rather the instant case would be controlled by Boyd. We, therefore, reverse and remand with directions that the order revoking appellant’s community control as well as the judgment and sentence entered subsequent to that revocation be vacated, that the affidavit alleging a violation of appellant’s community control be dismissed, and that the appellant be discharged.
JOANOS, WOLF and BENTON, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Slingbaum v. State, 751 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…nce been changed by the legislature so that a warrant is now "issued” when it is signed by the judge. See § 901.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). The change, however, is prospective only and has no effect on the resolution of this case. See McNeal v. State, 741 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).…
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Elvin Otis Morgan v. State, 757 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…t been set in motion before Morgan’s community control expired, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his community control and impose a new sentence. See id.; Slingbaum v. State, 751 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA [*620] 1999); McNeal v. State, 741 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). We note that because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, see Hoffman v. State, 729 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), Morgan could raise this defect at any time. See Tatum v. State, 736 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 199…
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Brown v. State, 745 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…PER CURIAM. Under our recent decision in McNeal v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2226, 741 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), appellant is entitled to discharge if the sheriffs office did not receive his arrest warrant for violation of probation prior to July 11, 1997, which he alleges is the case in this appeal. See also State v. Boyd, 717 So. 2d 524…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shiver v. State, 717 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1998)