GREGORY THOMAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Gregory Thomas appealed his sentence as a "prison releasee reoffender" following convictions for burglary and attempted burglary. The court reversed, holding that Thomas, who escaped from a work-release program, was not "released" within the meaning of the statute because release must be initiated by the State, not through self-release by the defendant.
A defendant cannot be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender when the defendant was not released by the State but instead escaped. The statute requires release to be initiated by the State, not through self-release or escape by the defendant.
[1] A defendant cannot be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender if the offenses were committed prior to an official release from a state correctional facility.
[2] The term "released" in the context of prison releasee reoffender statutes contemplates a release initiated by the State, not a "self-release" by the inmate.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where, as here, the language of the statute is susceptible of differing constructions, section 775.021(1) requires that we adopt the construction most favorable to the defendant.”
Establishes the canon of construction applied to resolve ambiguity in the statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThomas was confined at St. Petersburg Community Correctional Center. On September 27, 1997, he walked away from his work-release employment and did no…
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BLUE, Judge.
Gregory Thomas challenges his sentence as a “prison releasee reoffender” imposed following his convictions for burglary and attempted burglary. Because we conclude that Thomas had not been released from a state correctional facility at the time he committed the offenses for which he was sentenced, we reverse.
Thomas was confined in the St. Peters-burg Community Correctional Center, a state correctional facility. On September 27, 1997, he was charged with escape when he walked away from his work release employment and did not return to St. Pe-tersburg Community' Correctional Center. Thomas was charged with burglary and attempted burglary committed two days later. He was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, attempted burglary of a dwelling and escape. The trial court sentenced Thomas as a prison releasee reoffender for the burglary and attempted burglary.
Thomas was sentenced pursuant to section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). This statute provides that a defendant who commits or attempts to commit certain enumerated offenses, including burglary of a dwelling, within three years of being released from a state correctional facility, is a “prison releasee reoffender.” The statute in question does not define “released.” Thomas contends he cannot be an escapee and a releasee at the same time.
The State contends that when Thomas walked away from his work release, he accomplished “self-release” and was thus properly sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. Where, as here, the language of the statute is susceptible of differing constructions, section 775.021(1) requires that we adopt the construction most favorable to the defendant.
We reject the argument that the statute was intended to include “self-release” within the definition of release. Our reading of the statute convinces us that it contemplates a release initiated by the State. Accordingly, we reverse the imposition of the prison releasee reoffender portion of Thomas’ sentences and remand for deletion of that portion of the sentences. The sentences are otherwise affirmed. PATTERSON, C.J., Concurs.
GREEN, J., Dissents with opinion.
GREEN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the legislature has defined the status of a prisoner being afforded the privilege of work release as a released inmate.1 Section 947.175(2), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: “The department shall, at least 10 days before the anticipated date of release on work release of an inmate, notify the county law enforcement agency in the county in this state in which the inmate is scheduled to be released.”
The majority is correct in holding that an inmate does not create his/her own release by escaping from work release. However, the work release statute and the prison releasee reoffender statute are not inconsistent because the legislature has provided that the willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of his/her confinement or to return within the prescribed time to the place of confinement is “an escape from the custody of the department....” § 945.091(4), Fla. Stat. (1997). See also § 775.082(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997).
In summation, I would affirm the trial judge’s designation of Thomas as a prison releasee reoffender and therefore subject to the releasee-reoffender sanction provided by section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1997).
. Section 945.091, Florida Statutes (1997), is predicated upon the Department of Corrections' belief that an inmate "will honor his or her trust" upon being placed on work release.
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Brinson v. State, 851 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…e” can be defined to mean only actual release from a state prison sentence. Where the language of a statute is susceptible of differing constructions, the language must be construed most favorably to the defendant. See § 775.021(1); Thomas v. State, 741 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In construing the statutory language here favorably to Brinson, the word “release” means actual release from a state prison sentence, not release from a temporary confinement that happens to be in state prison. Accordingly, Brin…
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Cassista v. State, 57 So. 3d 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 928 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (Fla.2006). And, when the language of a statute is susceptible of differing constructions, the language must be construed most favorably to the defendant. § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2006); Thomas v. State, 741 So. 2d 1246, 1246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In most cases, it is a simple matter to determine when an individual is released from a state correctional facility. However, offenders are sometimes only temporarily detained. Unless those detentions “ripen” into reimpris…
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Lopez v. State, 864 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…der the PRR statute. Finally, we note that where, as in this case, “the language of the statute is susceptible of differing constructions, section 775.021(1) requires that we adopt the construction most favorable to the defendant.” Thomas v. State, 741 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Accordingly, we hold that solicitation to commit first-degree murder is not a qualifying offense under the PRR statute, and a conviction for that offense does not qualify Lopez for PRR status. We therefore reverse the trial court…
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