ERIC D. EBLIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eblin appeals the denial of his postconviction motion seeking clarification of his sentence. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences for three burglary convictions but used only precatory language regarding concurrence with an inevitable control release revocation sentence, mistakenly believing it lacked authority to order the Department of Corrections to run sentences concurrently. The appellate court reversed, holding the trial court had the authority to make sentences concurrent and would have done so had it understood its powers.
The trial court had the authority to order the Department of Corrections to run sentences concurrently. Because the record established that the trial court would have ordered concurrent sentencing had it correctly understood its authority, the postconviction motion should have been granted and the sentences amended.
[1] A trial court's misapprehension of its authority to order concurrent sentences may warrant postconviction relief.
[2] When a trial court mistakenly believes it lacks the authority to order concurrent sentences, and would have done so had it understood its powers, the sentences may be ame…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court simply noted on the face of Mr. Eblin's sentences that it had no objection to the burglary sentences being served concurrently with his control release sentence”
Establishes that the trial court used only precatory language rather than an explicit order regarding concurrent sentencing due to its mistaken belief about its authority.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEblin entered a plea agreement resolving three burglary cases with concurrent sentences. At the time of the burglaries, Eblin was on control release f…
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PER CURIAM.
Eric Eblin appeals an order denying his postconviction motion to clarify his sentence. The State concedes error and we reverse.
Mr. Eblin entered into a plea agreement to resolve three separate cases charging burglaries of dwellings.1 As a part of the agreement, Mr. Eblin was given concurrent sentences for all three cases. The terms of one of these sentences are discussed in greater detail in Eblin v. State, 677 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). At the time Mr. Eblin committed these burglaries, he was on “control release” from a prior sentence. The parties knew that Mr. Eblin’s control release would be revoked because of the burglary charges. See § 947.146(11), Fla. Stat. (1995). During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Eblin’s counsel requested that any sentences imposed on the burglary charges be concurrent with the inevitable sentence Mr. Eblin would receive when his control release was formally revoked. Both the State and the court stated they had no objection to this arrangement, but the court did not believe it had the authority to order the Department of Corrections to run all of Mr. Eb-lin’s sentences concurrently. Instead, the court simply noted on the face of Mr. Eblin’s sentences that it had no objection to the burglary sentences being served concurrently with his control release sentence.
Mr. Eblin alleges in his postconviction motion that the Department of Corrections has refused to run his burglary sentences concurrently with his control release sentence because of this precatory language, and instead has run these sentences consecutively. Mr. Eblin claims that because the sentences are consecutive, his overall sentence will be six years longer than if the sentences were concurrent. He also claims his gain time awards have been adversely affected.
The facts in this case closely resemble those in Kirkland v. State, 633 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), and Bruce v. State, 679 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Like Kirkland and Bruce, the only reason Mr. Eblin’s sentences are not concurrent is because the trial court mistakenly believed it did not have the authority to order the Department of Corrections to treat the sentences in this way. The record establishes that if the trial court had correctly understood the parameters of its authority, it would have ordered Mr. Eblin’s burglary and control release sentences to be served concurrently.2
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Mr. Eblin’s postconviction motion and remand this case to the trial court for it to amend Mr. Eblin’s judgments and sentences to reflect that the sentences in his three burglary cases are to run concurrently with his control release sentence.
Reversed and remanded.
ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and BLUE and DAVIS, JJ., Concur. . Case numbers 95-45-CF, 95-48-CF, and 95-49CF. . We commend the assistant attorney general who handled this case for conceding the error.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Horton v. State, 976 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…tconviction relief which was filed within two years after his judgment and sentence became final. We reverse. In his motion, Horton presented a claim based on circumstances that differ in no material respect from those presented in Eblin v. State, 743 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In Eblin, the postconviction motion was predicated on events at a sentencing hearing where counsel for Eblin requested that his sentences for three burglary offenses be imposed concurrently with a sentence to be imposed in a pend…
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Johnson v. State, 972 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…about its authority to direct that incarceration arising from the conditional release violation be served concurrently with the sentences imposed on the new offenses. We note in passing that sentencing courts have that authority. See Eblin v. State, 743 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Jones v. State, 696 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Kirkland v. State, 633 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Bruce v. State, 679 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). The postconviction court, however, did not address the alleged discrepan…
Authorities Cited
- Bruce v. State, 679 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Eblin v. State, 677 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Kirkland v. State, 633 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)