CHARLES W. BURNSED, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court erred in designating the appellant a sexual predator because the stipulated offense date preceded the effective date of the sexual predator statute.
Charles Burnsed pleaded guilty to attempted capital sexual battery and handling a child, with a stipulated offense date of July 8, 1991. The State mov…
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PER CURIAM.
Charles Burnsed (“Burnsed”) appeals the trial court’s declaration that he qualifies for sexual predator designation. We reverse.
On August 12, 1996, the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pasco County, filed an information charging Burnsed with one count of capital sexual battery and four counts of handling and fondling a female child under the age of sixteen, in violation of section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), and section 800.04(1), Florida Statutes (1991), respectively. The information alleges that the offenses occurred between July 8, 1991, and July 7, 1994. On June 23, 1997, Burnsed pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of attempted capital sexual battery, and to the four counts of handling or fondling a female child under the age of sixteen. At the time of the entry of the plea, Burnsed and the State stipulated to an offense date of July 8,1991.
On February 26, 1998, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to have Burnsed declared a sexual predator. Burnsed’s attorney objected to the motion, pointing out that the offense date preceded the effective date of the sexual predator statute. The trial court overruled the objection and granted the State’s motion. This appeal followed.
Burnsed argues that he does not qualify for sexual predator status. The sexual predator statute specifically states that it applies to convictions for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1993. See §§ 775.21-23, Fla. Stat. (1993); § 775.22, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996).
We agree that the trial court erred in disregarding the stipulation. ‘Where appropriately made, stipulations are binding not only upon the parties but also upon the trial and appellate courts.” McGoey v. State, 736 So. 2d 31, 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (citing Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.1971), and Lopez v. Dublin Co., 489 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)).
Reversed.
BLUE, A.C.J., and FULMER and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
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Maldonado v. State, 992 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…olonged. On appeal, the State cannot avoid the effect of its concession in the trial court of a fact material to the disposition of Mr. Maldonado’s motion. See Duan v. State, 970 So. 2d [*843] 903, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); see also Burnsed v. State, 743 So. 2d 139, 139-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“ ‘Where appropriately made, stipulations are binding not only upon the parties but also upon the trial and appellate courts.’ ” (quoting McGoey v. State, 736 So. 2d 31, 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999))). Based on the State’s conce…
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Sommers v. State, 796 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…1, 1992. Thus, the trial court will have to determine the date of the offenses on remand. If the record reflects that the parties have stipulated to April 1, 1992, as the date of the offense, the court is bound by that stipulation. Burnsed v. State, 743 So. 2d 139, 139-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (requiring court to honor stipulation as to offense date for pur [*610] poses of determining whether the defendant could be classified as a sexual predator).…
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Doretta Turner v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Gallagher-Bassett Servs., Inc., 941 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…ipulate is binding upon the parties and upon the Court.” Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.1971). Accord Hufcor/Gulfstream, Inc. v. Homestead Concrete & Drainage, Inc., 831 So. 2d 767, 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Burnsed v. State, 743 So. 2d 139, 139-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Here, it would appear that the provision in the pretrial stipulation by which the parties agreed that claimant’s “[ijnjuries or conditions” were compensa-ble relieved claimant of any obligation to establish compensability…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. The Dania Bank, 252 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971)
- McGOEY v. State, 736 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Lopez v. The Dublin Co., 489 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)