WALTER JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Walter Jones appeals the revocation of his community control after being discharged from a court-ordered drug treatment program for making a threat and refusing to outline a behavior improvement plan. The appellate court reversed the revocation, finding that the violation was neither willful nor substantial, and that the original community control order was insufficiently specific regarding the treatment completion requirements.
The court reversed the revocation because the violation was not proven to be both willful and substantial by the greater weight of evidence. The community control order was insufficiently specific regarding the timeframe and number of opportunities to complete the program, and because Jones expressed willingness to complete treatment, the trial court abused its discretion in revoking community control.
[1] A violation of probation must be willful and substantial to trigger revocation.
[2] A defendant's willingness to complete a condition of probation in some acceptable form weighs against finding the violation willful and substantial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A violation of community control which triggers revocation must be both willful and substantial, and the willful and substantial nature of the violation must be supported by the greater weight of the evidence.”
Establishes the legal standard required to revoke community control
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones was required by special condition 22 of his community control to successfully complete the Day Top residential drug treatment program. After com…
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STRINGER, Judge.
Appellant, Walter Jones, challenges the revocation of his community control. We reverse because appellant’s community control violation was not willful or substantial.
Appellant’s community control violation stems from the fact that he was discharged from the Day Top Drug Treatment Facility after threatening another resident. Special condition twenty-two (22) of appellant’s community control required that he “enter and successfully complete residential treatment program (DAY TOP).” The record of the revocation hearing reveals that appellant was enrolled in the Day Top drug program as ordered. Appellant had completed eleven months of the twelvemonth residential portion of the program. Maureen Quavis, a clinical counselor, testified that one day during a group counseling session another resident was critical of appellant’s behavior in the program. Appellant and the other resident began to argue, and appellant ultimately told the resident, “I’m going to get you.” Appellant was then removed from the group and taken to the director of the Day Top program. The director told appellant that in order to remain in the program he would have to present himself before the entire community of residents, admit his transgression, and outline a plan as to how he would change his behavior to ensure that such threats are not made in the future. A few days later, appellant went before the residents and apologized for his threatening statement. However, appellant refused to outline a plan as to how he would prevent such threats from occurring in the future. Appellant was discharged from the program the following day.
At trial, appellant testified that he did not outline a plan as instructed because at the time he was angry and could not continue speaking before the community. Appellant testified that he needed treatment and wanted to continue his treatment at the Day Top program or attend another drug treatment facility.
A violation of community control which triggers revocation must be both willful and substantial, and the willful and substantial nature of the violation must be supported by the greater weight of the evidence. See Hightower v. State, 529 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Although appellant was discharged from the Day Top drug program, he expressed a willingness to continue in the program or complete some other form of drug treatment. The community control order did not specify the period within which appellant was to complete the program or how many chances he would have to obtain success. See Salzano v. State, 664 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Since the order was not specific and appellant has expressed a willingness to complete some form of drug treatment, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking appellant’s community control. See Salzano, 664 So. 2d at 24; Young v. State, 566 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
Accordingly, we reverse the revocation order and remand this cause with di rections to reinstate appellant’s community control.
Reversed and remanded.
PATTERSON, C.J, and NORTHCUTT, J., Concur.
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Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2007)…tion ... did not specify that the program be completed within a certain time frame or within a certain number of attempts” and there was sufficient time remaining in the probationary period for completion. Id. at 1017-18. Lastly, in Jones v. State, 744 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the trial court ordered Jones to “enter and successfully complete residential treatment program (DAY TOP).” Id. at 538. However, he was discharged from the twelve-month program after eleven months because he threatened another re…1 / 2
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Dwaine Woodson v. State, 864 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…rsonnel, indicating that Woodson was "instructed” on these conditions. .See Palma v. State, 830 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); O’Neal v. State, 801 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Butler v. State, 775 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Jones v. State, 744 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Gamble v. State, 737 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Mitchell v. State, 717 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Edgerton v. State, 703 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Salzano v. State, 664 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Melecio v. S…
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Denny Mills v. State, 840 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…a time period within which Mills was to complete the sex offender program, his excessive unexcused absences should not be grounds for revoking his probation. For support, he cites O’Neal v. State, 801 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), Jones v. State, 744 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and Salzano v. State, 664 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). While the cited cases did involve the lack of specificity as to a time period, they are distinguishable because, in each, the conduct was not deemed willful, as the appellan…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hightower v. State, 529 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Young v. State, 566 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Ricci M. Salzano v. State, 664 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)