JUSTIN DAVID TEGROTENHUIS, APPELLANT,
v.
LYNN ANN RICE, AS TRUSTEE OF A TESTAMENTARY TRUST OF MARJORIE ELEANOR TEGROTENHUIS, NEIL ALCOTT TEGROTENHUIS, AS TRUSTEE OF A TESTAMENTARY TRUST OF MARJORIE ELEANOR TEGROTENHUIS, AND DAVID TEGROTENHUIS, APPELLEES
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Justin David TeGrotenhuis appealed the dismissal of his complaint seeking declaratory relief and an accounting as a beneficiary under his grandmother's testamentary trust. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that TeGrotenhuis is a contingent beneficiary rather than a vested beneficiary and therefore lacks current standing to pursue relief.
The appellant is a contingent beneficiary, not a vested beneficiary, because the element of futurity is annexed to the substance of his gift rather than merely to the enjoyment of it. Multiple conditions precedent must be satisfied before the appellant can take under the trust: his father must die leaving issue (including the appellant), the trustee must decide to distribute income, or the youngest grandchild must reach age twenty-one. Because these conditions have not yet occurred and income is not currently accruing for the appellant's benefit, he is not entitled to the relief requested.
[1] A devise is prima facie contingent if it is to an individual or class upon attaining a certain age, but it is vested if it also carries the income from the estate to accr…
[2] A gift is contingent when the element of futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift rather than the enjoyment of it.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The rule seems to be well settled that where there is a devise to an individual or a class upon attaining a certain age, such devise is prima facie contingent; but when the devise carries to the same individual or class, the income from the estate to accrue in the meantime, it will be construed as conferring a vested interest.”
Establishes the general rule for distinguishing vested and contingent remainders in Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant's grandmother died testate, establishing three separate trusts with provisions that income would be distributed to her children and, upo…
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GUNTHER, J.
The appellant, Justin David TeGroten-huis, appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his third amended complaint with prejudice. We affirm, but comment briefly on the appellant’s status as a contingent beneficiary.
The appellant’s grandmother died testate. Her will provided that certain portions of her estate should be transferred into three separate trusts with the appellant’s grandfather as the income beneficiary. After the appellant’s grandfather disclaimed his interest, the grandmother’s children, including the appellant’s father, became the income beneficiaries. The appellant is seeking declaratory relief and an accounting based upon his interest provided in the following trust provision:
If any such child shall die leaving no issue, then the income that would have been distributed to him (or her) shall be paid to the surviving beneficiary of said trust, and at his (or her) death, the trust res that produced such income shall be distributed to my then living grandchildren, share and share alike. If any child shall die leaving issue, then the income that would have been paid to the issue of the parent of said issue if he or she would have lived shall be paid to said issue or accumulated in trust, as trustee shall determine. When the youngest of the issue of any one of my children (then dead) reaches the age of twenty-one years, the entire one-half portion of the trust res, i.e. that part from which the income was or should have been distributed to my (now dead) child if he had lived, shall be distributed to his children, share and share alike per stirpes.
(emphasis added).
The Florida Supreme Court commented on the distinction between vested and contingent remainders as follows,
The rule seems to be well settled that where there is a devise to an individual or a class upon attaining a certain age, such devise is prima facie contingent; but when the devise carries to the same individual or class, the income from the estate to accrue in the meantime, it will be construed as conferring a vested interest.
Sorrels v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 467, 105 So. 106, 110 (1925) (emphasis added). When “the element of futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift, rather than the enjoyment of it, vesting is suspended and the gift is contingent.” Travis v. Ashton, 156 Fla. 529, 532, 23 So. 2d 725, 726 (1945). “An estate is contingent if, in order for it to become a present estate, the fulfillment of some condition precedent other than the determination of the preceding freehold estates is necessary.” Story v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 445, 156 So. 101, 105 (1934).
We conclude that the element of futurity is annexed to the substance of the appellant’s gift and that the appellant is a contingent beneficiary. See Travis, 156 Fla. at 532, 23 So. 2d at 726 (explaining that when futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift as opposed to the enjoyment, the gift is contingent). Presently, the appellant is the youngest grandchild and his father, who is a current income beneficiary, is still alive. Therefore, in order for the appellant to take under the terms of the trust, the following conditions would have to occur: (1) the appellant’s father would have to die leaving issue, one of whom must be the appellant and (2) the trustee must decide to distribute income or (3) the youngest grandchild (currently, the appellant) must reach age twenty-one. These conditions have not yet been met. In addition, the income is not accruing for the benefit of the appellant; rather it is being distributed to the current income beneficiaries. As such, the appellant is a contingent beneficiary and not currently entitled to the relief requested. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the third amended complaint with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
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Carvel v. Godley, 939 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…dual beneficiary, is an intended beneficiary. The foundation’s remainder interest is contingent because it is predicated upon, the existence of property left in the trust after the specific condition precedent is satisfied. See TeGrotenhuis v. Rice, 744 So. 2d 1057, 1058 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). “The question of whether a contract was intended for the benefit of a third person is generally regarded as one [*208] of construction of the contract. The intention of the parties in this respect is determined by the ter…
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Royal Hayes v. Rogers, 50 So. 3d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See TeGrotenhuis v. Rice, 744 So. 2d 1057, 1057-1058 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). STEVENSON, HAZOURI and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Sorrells v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457 (Fla. 1925)
- Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 115 Fla. 436 (Fla. 1934)
- Sassnett v. State, 156 Fla. 529 (Fla. 1945)
- Travis v. Ashton, 156 Fla. 529 (Fla. 1945)