BETTER ROADS INCORPORATED, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIA DE JESUS GONZALEZ, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BERNARDO GONZALEZ; MARIA DE JESUS GONZALEZ, AS PARENT AND ON BEHALF OF JUAN MIGUEL GONZALEZ, A MINOR; MARIA DE JESUS GONZALEZ, AS PARENT AND ON BEHALF OF OSCAR FERNANDO GONZALEZ DIAZ, A MINOR; AND MARIA DE JESUS GONZALEZ, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES, AND RONALD DALE WALKER AND KREHLING INDUSTRIES, INC., THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES
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STRINGER, Judge.
Appellant, Better Roads, Inc., appeals a nonfinal order denying its motion for summary judgment on its claim of workers’ compensation immunity. The order denying summary judgment simply denies the motion without stating a reason for the denial. In order to be appealable, a nonfi-nal order denying a summary judgment motion which is based on workers’ compensation immunity must specifically state that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to raise the workers’ compensation immunity defense at trial. See Department of Corrections v. Culver, 716 So. 2d 768 (Fla.1998). Because the order in the instant case fails to make such a statement, we lack jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi) to review this order. Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
PATTERSON, C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J., Concur.
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Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes OF Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 2004)…A 2000) (dismissing appeal from nonfinal order because bare bones order of denial of motion for summary judgment on the ground of workers’ compensation immunity is not subject to review under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi)); Better Roads, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 744 So. 2d 1123, 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding no jurisdiction where order simply denied summary judgment without stating reason); Martin Elecs., Inc. v. Glombowski, 705 So. 2d 26, 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding no jurisdiction where order denying motion to dis…
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Amstar Ins. Co. v. Cadet, 862 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…ny pursuant to section 626.842, Florida Statutes (1989), or be clothed with actual or apparent authority so that the broker’s acts may be binding on the insurance company) (citations omitted); see also Guarente-Desantolo v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 744 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We must, therefore, first determine whether the McClain Agency was a broker or an insurance agent for Amstar. Broker Or Insurance Agent An “insurance broker” is one who solicits insurance orders from the general public a…
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Mercury Ins. Co. OF Fla. v. Markham, 36 So. 3d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…adet, 862 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Straw v. Assoc. Doctors Health & Life, 728 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). In such case, the knowledge of the broker would be imputed to the insurance company. Guarente-Desantolo v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 744 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In the present case, the broker was asking the insured questions from the company’s application form. If the broker knew the condition of the truck, as the insured says she did, her knowledge would be imputed to the insurance co…
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- Fla. Dep't OF Corr. v. Culver, 716 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1998)