DONOVAN A. REID, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief because the rehearing motion was a successive 3.850 motion filed after initial denial, and the Brady claim was legally insufficient for failing to allege the evidence was unknown and could not have been discovered through due diligence.
A rehearing motion filed after denial of an initial 3.850 motion constitutes a successive motion barred by rule, and a Brady claim based on newly discovered evidence is legally insufficient if it fails to allege the evidence was unknown and could not have been ascertained through due diligence.
[1] A motion for rehearing filed after denial of an initial Rule 3.850 postconviction motion constitutes a successive motion barred by Rule 3.850(f).
[2] A Brady claim based on newly discovered evidence is legally insufficient under Rule 3.850(b)(1) unless it alleges the exculpatory evidence was unknown to the movant or co…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReid filed a postconviction relief motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which was denied. He then filed a rehearing motion that was …
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the denial of postcon-viction relief on the ground that appellant’s rehearing motion was, in reality, an amended 3.850 motion filed after the court had already denied the initial motion. As such, the motion was successive. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(f); Shaw v. State, 654 So. 2d 608, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
Moreover, while the Brady claim1 was allegedly based on newly discovered evidence, the claim was legally insufficient in that it failed to allege that the exculpatory evidence was “unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1); see also Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla.1991) (defining “newly discovered evidence” for purposes of Rule 3.850).
This affirmance is without prejudice to appellant’s right to file, within 30 days of the issuance of the mandate, a motion that complies with the pleading requirements of Rule 3.850 with respect to claims of newly discovered evidence. See Jones v. State, 708 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (affirming denial of 3.850 motion as legally insufficient under Rule 3.850(c), but without prejudice to appellant refiling a motion that complies with the requirements of the rule).
DELL, GUNTHER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. . Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963)
- Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991)
- Shaw v. State, 654 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Maceo Wright v. State, 708 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Jones v. State, 708 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)