DOMINIC SANTEUFEMIO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dominic Santeufemio appeals a probation revocation hearing conducted in his absence after he voluntarily left the courthouse. The court affirmed the revocation, finding that Santeufemio's voluntary flight constituted a waiver of his right to be present at the probation revocation proceeding.
The trial court did not err because Santeufemio waived his right to be present at the probation revocation hearing by voluntarily absenting himself. A defendant's voluntary flight from the courtroom after receiving notice and being present constitutes a valid waiver of the right to attend a probation revocation proceeding, even without an express waiver.
[1] A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at sentencing.
[2] A defendant may waive the right to be present at sentencing.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where a defendant absents himself or herself by fleeing the court's jurisdiction, that defendant cannot claim lack of an express waiver. In such circumstances, securing an express waiver is impossible and the defendant's actions constitute a valid waiver.”
Establishes the legal principle that voluntary flight from court constitutes an implied waiver of the right to be present at sentencing or probation revocation proceedings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSanteufemio was charged with probation violations and a hearing was scheduled for May 15, 1998. He appeared at the courthouse with counsel that mornin…
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STRINGER, Judge.
Dominic Santeufemio appeals an order revoking his probation. Santeufemio argues that the trial court erred in conducting a probation revocation hearing in his absence. We affirm because Santeufemio waived his right to be present at the hearing.
Santeufemio was charged with several violations of his probation. A probation revocation hearing was scheduled on May 15, 1998. On that day, Santeufemio was present at the courthouse with his counsel. During the morning calendar call, Santeu-femio’s counsel learned that the trial court intended to impose a prison sentence if the State proved the alleged violations. San-teufemio’s counsel informed him of the trial court’s intentions. When Santeufemio’s case was called approximately two hours later, he was not present in the courthouse.
The trial court concluded that San-teufemio had voluntarily absented himself from the hearing and conducted the probation revocation hearing in absentia. San-teufemio was found to have violated the terms of his probation. In a subsequent hearing at which Santeufemio was present, the trial court sentenced him to sixty-six-months in prison.
The purpose of a probation revocation hearing is to determine whether the terms of a defendant’s probation for a prior crime have been violated. As such, a probation revocation hearing constitutes a deferred sentencing proceeding. See Green v. State, 463 So. 2d 1139 (Fla.1985). Sentencing is a critical stage of criminal prosecution for which the defendant has a constitutional right to attend. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.180(a)(9) (mandating that criminal defendants be present at the imposition of sentence); Nelson v. State, 724 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
However, defendants may waive their right to be present at sentencing. See Capuzzo v. State, 596 So. 2d 438 (Fla.1992) (holding that defendants may voluntarily waive their right to be present during sentencing); State v. Gurican, 576 So. 2d 709, 712 (Fla.1991) (“[W]here the convicted defendant escapes and fails to appear for sentencing, we advise trial courts to proceed in absentia and render their final judgments adjudicating the defendant guilty.”). In the present case, the trial court concluded that Santeufemio’s voluntary decision to flee the courthouse constituted a waiver of his right to be present at the probation revocation hearing.
We agree.
The Supreme Court of Florida dealt with a situation similar to the present case in Capuzzo v. State, 596 So. 2d 438 (Fla.1992). In Capuzzo the defendant absconded prior to his sentencing hearing after learning that the State would oppose his motion to continue the hearing. The trial court found that the defendant had voluntarily absented himself from the hearing and sentenced the defendant in absentia. In upholding the sentence, the supreme court stated, “Where a defendant absents himself or herself by fleeing the court’s jurisdiction, that defendant cannot claim lack of an express waiver. In such circumstances, securing an express waiver is impossible and the defendant’s actions constitute a valid waiver.” Capuzzo, 596 So. 2d at 440.
In the present case, Santeufemio had notice of the scheduled probation revocation hearing, and he was present at the courthouse on the date of the hearing. Santeufemio voluntarily fled from the hearing. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Santeufe-mio’s probation in absentia.
Affirmed.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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M.W.G. v. State, 945 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…at 808. In the alternative, a defendant may voluntarily absent himself from the proceedings by intentionally fleeing the jurisdiction or by leaving court during the proceedings. Capuzzo v. State, 596 So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla.1992); Santeufemio v. State, 745 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In this case, there is nothing in the record to show that M.W.G. voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings by fleeing the jurisdiction or leaving court during the proceedings. Therefore, the question before the tri…
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Peters v. State, 984 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2008)…on proceedings, this Court and others have characterized probation revocation hearings as deferred sentencing proceedings. See Green v. State, 463 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 1985); Tur v. State, 797 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Santeufemio v. State, 745 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Florida law explicitly reflects this characterization: if probation or community control is revoked, the court is required to adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless…1 / 2
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Shields v. State, 296 So. 3d 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…d DCA 2009) ("If the court could not have imposed imprisonment because a defendant was not represented in the underlying misdemeanor proceedings, - 6 - it cannot impose incarceration upon an ensuing revocation of probation."); Santeufemio v. State, 745 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (explaining that "[s]entencing is a critical stage of criminal prosecution for which the defendant has a constitutional right to attend" in the context of a postrevocation sentencing). We thus see no reason in law or logic…
Authorities Cited
- Capuzzo v. State, 596 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1992)
- State v. Gurican, 576 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1991)
- Green v. State, 463 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1985)
- Ernie Howard Nelson v. State, 724 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)