GEORGIA M. BROOKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; CHARLES E. ROBERTS, APPELLANT, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of appellants' motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop. The court held that Officer Bates conducted an unlawful investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion by activating his flashing blue lights, making the subsequent evidence seizure unconstitutional.
The court held that the trial court's finding of a consensual encounter was clearly erroneous. Because Officer Bates activated his flashing blue lights—which would communicate to a reasonable person that they were not free to leave—the encounter constituted an investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion. Since Bates lacked reasonable suspicion, the stop was unlawful and the evidence should have been suppressed.
[1] A police officer's activation of flashing blue lights constitutes a show of authority that transforms a police-citizen encounter into an investigatory stop.
[2] An investigatory stop requires a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a reasonable person under such circumstances would not have believed he or she was free to leave and terminate the encounter”
Establishes the standard for determining whether police conduct constitutes a consensual encounter or an investigatory stop based on a reasonable person's perspective
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Bates approached appellants' vehicle, which was pulled off the roadway while the driver was being changed. Bates activated his flashing blue l…
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ERVIN, J.
In these two consolidated appeals, appellants, Georgia M. Brooks and Charles E. Roberts, contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress evidence which was seized as a result of an unlawful stop. We agree and therefore reverse and remand with directions to discharge appellants.
The state maintained below that Officer Bates approached appellants’ vehicle, which had pulled off the side of the road to change drivers, in a consensual police-citizen encounter and that appellants were free to leave at any time. Bates admitted that he did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time he approached appellants’ vehicle, and he said the encounter was not an investigatory stop. See Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993) (distinguishing consensual police-citizen encounters, in which the citizen may voluntarily comply with the officer’s request or choose to ignore it, from investigatory stops, which require the officer to have a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity before detaining the citizen).
And see § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1997) (Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law).
We conclude that the trial court’s finding of an consensual encounter is clearly erroneous. Officer Bates activated his flashing blue lights when he pulled up behind appellants’ stopped vehicle. As Brooks was driving the vehicle onto the roadway, she stopped when she saw the flashing lights and uniformed police officer approaching the car.
Section 316.2397, Florida Statutes (1997), allows only police vehicles to have blue flashing lights, and section 316.126, Florida Statutes (1997), requires all vehicles to pull to the closest edge of the roadway upon the approach of a vehicle displaying blue or red lights. Bates admitted he makes traffic stops with his flashing lights and siren. While Bates testified that he activated the lights as a safety precaution, a reasonable person under such circumstances would not have believed he or she was free to leave and terminate the encounter. See State v. Ferrell, 705 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Jones v. State, 658 So. 2d 178, 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (both stating that the question of whether there has been a consensual encounter requires a court to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police officers’ conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officers’ request or otherwise terminate the encounter).
Based on the show of authority by Bates’ use of the flashing blue lights, the encounter constituted an investigatory stop. Because Bates admitted he did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he lacked authority under section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1997), to stop appellants. See Graham v. State, 714 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Therefore, the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful detention should have been suppressed. As this issue is dispositive, we remand with directions to set aside the judgments and orders placing appellants on probation.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to discharge appellants.
LAWRENCE and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Donnie Young v. State, 803 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…t an officer’s use of his or her emergency lights evidences an investigatory stop rather than a consensual encounter. See, e.g., Siplin v. State, 795 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Hrezo v. State, 780 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Brooks v. State, 745 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The reason such encounters are investigatory stops rather than consensual encounters is the use of the emergency lights leads the citizen to believe that he or she is no longer free to leave. Id. Moreover, for the same reason, p…1 / 2
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G.M. v. State, 19 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2009)…. 4th DCA 2004); Errickson v. State, 855 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Young v. State, 803 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Siplin v. State, 795 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Hrezo v. State, 780 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); and Brooks v. State, 745 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), as cases in conflict. Below, one judge agreed with the decision to certify conflict to this Court, but dissented from the majority opinion and concluded that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. See id. a…
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Hrezo v. State, 780 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…nd eluding if he or she drove away. See § 316.126, Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. McCune, 772 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, the use of such lights is typically regarded as an act that initiates an investigatory stop. See Brooks v. State, 745 So. 2d 1113, 1113-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).1 We emphasize that an officer’s use of a spotlight is not the same as the use of emergency lights. See State v. Wimbush, 668 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (reversing suppression where officers pulled alongside parked c…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- Garrett Jones v. State, 658 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Jamall Graham v. State, 714 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- State v. Ferrell, 705 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)