JAMES BELL, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Bell appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief following his no contest plea to resisting an officer with violence and unlawful possession of a firearm. Bell claimed his counsel falsely assured him he would only serve 85% of his sentence, not the full mandatory minimum, and that he would not have pleaded had he known the truth. The appellate court reversed, finding Bell entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim.
Under State v. Leroux and subsequent precedent, Bell is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim. The trial court's denial of the postconviction motion without a hearing was erroneous because the plea colloquy did not address how much time the defendant would be required to serve, and Bell's sworn allegations that counsel assured him he would only serve 85% of the sentence were not conclusively refuted by the record.
[1] A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim that counsel provided erroneous advice regarding the percentage of a sentence that would be required to be se…
[2] A defendant's prior experience with mandatory minimum sentences does not conclusively refute a claim that counsel provided erroneous advice about the percentage of a sent…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While the plea colloquy indicates that the sentences being imposed were mandatory minimum sentences, the plea colloquy nowhere addressed the issue of how much time the defendant would be required to serve.”
Establishes that the critical distinction is whether the plea colloquy discussed the actual time to be served, and here it did not.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBell entered a no contest plea pursuant to a plea agreement to resisting an officer with violence and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted …
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COPE, J.
James Bell appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. We reverse.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant-appellant Bell entered a no contest plea to resisting an officer with violence and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender to a five- year mandatory minimum term on the former offense, and a concurrent ten-year mandatory minimum term on the latter offense.
Defendant filed a sworn motion for post-conviction relief stating that his counsel had repeatedly advised him that he would only be required to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence. Witnesses to this advice included his brother, Bernard Bell, and a friend, Lamont Harris. He stated that upon arrival at the Department of Corrections, he was informed that the entirety of the sentence was a mandatory minimum, which would require him to serve one-hundred percent of the sentence imposed. Defendant asserted that, had he known this, he would not have entered into the plea agreement, and requested leave to withdraw the plea. The trial court denied the postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing, and defendant has appealed.
While the plea colloquy indicates that the sentences being imposed were mandatory minimum sentences, the plea colloquy nowhere addressed the issue of how much time the defendant would be required to serve. Defendant’s sworn motion states that he was repeatedly told by his counsel that he would only have to serve eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed. The record does not conclusively refute that claim. Under State v. Leroux, 689 So. 2d 235 (Fla.1996), and the subsequent decisions interpreting it, defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. See Rensoli v. State, 718 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); see also Rivero v. State, 744 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Isaza v. State, 746 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Flores v. State, 717 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Yates v. State, 720 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Booth v. State, 687 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
As the Florida Supreme Court has explained:
A defendant who is informed by the court during the plea colloquy that he may have to serve every day of a ten-year sentence could hardly reasonably rely on counsel’s advice to the contrary. But, if that matter was not discussed when the plea was taken, a hearing would be necessary to determine the merits of a defendant’s claim that he relied in good faith upon the erroneous advice of his attorney in entering a plea.
Leroux, 689 So. 2d at 238 (citations omitted); Hoskins v. State, 713 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
In rejecting defendant’s claim, the trial court pointed out that in 1991 defendant had been sentenced to a term of years which included a three-year mandatory minimum sentence. The court reasoned that the defendant necessarily must know what a mandatory minimum sentence is and that he must have understood the legal significance of his plea. We do not think that fact overcomes the defendant’s assertion that counsel assured him he would only be required to serve 85% of his sentence. Under Leroux, defendant is entitled to a hearing on his claim.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Leroux, 689 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1996)
- Rensoli v. State, 718 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Booth v. State, 687 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- State v. Reniel Santiago, 713 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Jerome v. State, 744 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Rivero v. State, 744 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Flores v. State, 717 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Clemente Isaza v. State, 746 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Javon Osle Yates v. State, 720 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)