MANUEL FERNANDEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Manuel Fernandez appeals his first-degree murder and burglary convictions, challenging the trial court's rejection of his objection to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike African-American jurors. The appellate court reverses and remands for a new trial, finding the trial court erred in ruling the objection untimely and in accepting the prosecutor's pretextual reason for striking a juror.
The court held that an objection to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is timely if made at any point before the jury is sworn, not necessarily immediately after each individual strike. Additionally, a prosecutor cannot use lack of information caused by the prosecutor's own failure to question a prospective juror as a valid reason for a peremptory strike.
[1] An objection to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is timely if made at any time before the jury is sworn.
[2] There is no requirement that an objection to a discriminatory peremptory challenge be made immediately after each juror is challenged.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An objection to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges raised during the voir dire or selection process is timely if made at any time before the jury is sworn.”
Establishes the standard for timeliness of discriminatory challenge objections, rejecting the requirement for immediate objection after each strike.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike three African-American prospective jurors. After the prosecutor struck the …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Discriminatory Use Of Peremptory Challenges cases and more on FLexlaw
FLETCHER, Judge.
Manuel Fernandez appeals his convictions of first-degree murder and burglary of an occupied dwelling. Because of errors in the jury selection process, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
During jury selection, the State used its first peremptory challenge to strike an African-American prospective juror. Ultimately a twelve-member panel which included two other African-Americans (Shiffrin and Lewis) was tendered. Before the jury was sworn, however, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged first Shiffrin and then Lewis. Immediately after the striking of Lewis, defense counsel alleged the systematic removal of African-American jurors by the State, and requested a Neil
inquiry. At the conclusion of the inquiry the court permitted the peremptory strike of Shiffrin on the basis that the defense’s objection thereto came too late, not having been made immediately after the State’s striking of Shiffrin.
We conclude that the trial court erred when it overruled as untimely defense counsel’s objection to the striking of Shiffrin. An objection to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges raised during the voir dire or selection process is timely if made at any time before the jury is sworn. Blackshear v. State, 521 So. 2d 1083 (Fla.1988); Murphy v. State, 708 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Williams v. State, 551 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. denied 560 So. 2d 235 (Fla.1990). There is no requirement that an objection be made immediately after each juror is challenged. Here, defense counsel objected to the State’s challenges after the State requested the removal of the third African-American on the panel (Lewis) and it appeared to him that a pattern of discrimination had been established.
We also find that the trial court should not have accepted the prosecutor’s stated reason for striking Shiffrin, which reason was a lack of information on the prosecutor’s part because of failure to examine or question Shiffrin. An attorney cannot decline the opportunity to question a prospective juror, then use the lack of information caused by this failure as a reason to support her or his peremptory challenge. A perfunctory examination (or none) is indicative of a disingenuous or pretextual explanation for a challenge. See, e.g. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.1988) (The utter failure to question challenged jurors on the grounds alleged for bias renders the state’s explanation immediately suspect); Burris v. State, 748 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(If the state had been genuinely interested in a juror’s ability to understand the proceedings, the state would have sufficiently explored the subject with her); Overstreet v. State, 712 So. 2d 1174, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(A perfunctory or cursory examination of a potential juror as to her uncertainty about accepting testimonial evidence was insufficient); Haile v. State, 672 So. 2d 555, 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(The utter failure to question a potential juror about the subject matter forming the basis of the strike was a source of immediate suspicion).
For the reasons stated, we reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial.
. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1984).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Leopole Julmice v. State, 14 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…4 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Overstreet v. State, 712 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We have not hesitated to reverse a trial court’s finding on the ultimate issue of pretext where the record does not support that finding. Fernandez v. State, 746 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Randall v. State, 718 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Overstreet, 712 So. 2d at 1174. In the case of Hamdeh v. State, 762 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), defense counsel was denied the right to exercise a peremptory challenge of…
-
Ryan v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)…ignore such statements and did not err in considering those statements in imposing the legal sentence here.”) Affirmed.3 3 We find no merit in the remaining points raised on appeal, and affirm without further discussion. See Fernandez v. State, 746 So. 2d 516, 517-18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“[T]he trial court should not have accepted the prosecutor's stated reason for striking [the prospective juror], which reason was a lack of information on the prosecutor's part because of failure to examine or question [t…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984)
- State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)
- Blackshear v. State, 521 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1988)
- Overstreet v. State, 712 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Williams v. State, 551 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Burris v. State, 748 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Haile v. State, 672 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Murphy v. State, 708 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)