REGINALD A. CRUMP, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Reginald Crump appealed his sentences under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act following convictions for resisting arrest with violence and felony petit theft. The court rejected his constitutional challenges to the statute but vacated the felony petit theft sentence because that offense is not enumerated in the statute as one for which such a sentence may be imposed.
The court rejected all constitutional challenges to section 775.082(8), including vagueness, double jeopardy, single subject, separation of powers, cruel and unusual punishment, due process, and equal protection challenges. However, the court vacated the felony petit theft sentence because felony petit theft is not a statutorily enumerated offense for which a prison releasee reoffender sentence may be lawfully imposed.
[1] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if its terms are understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence using the plain and ordinary meaning of the words.
[2] A defendant lacks standing to challenge a statute's double jeopardy implications regarding habitual offender sentencing if the defendant was not sentenced as a habitual o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“words in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and the appellant has failed to identify how the plain language of the statute renders it impossible for a person of ordinary intelligence to read the statute and understand how the legislature intended these terms to apply”
Establishes the standard for rejecting vagueness challenges to statutory language
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCrump was convicted of resisting arrest with violence and felony petit theft. He was sentenced pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)…
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ALLEN, J.
The appellant in this direct criminal appeal challenges his sentences imposed pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the “Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act,” following his convictions for resisting arrest with violence and felony petit theft. We reject the appellant’s various constitutional challenges to section 775.082(8), but we vacate the sentence for felony petit theft because felony petit theft is not an offense for which a prison releasee reoffender sentence may be imposed.
We have previously rejected several of the appellant’s constitutional challenges, including the single subject challenge, see Jackson v. State, 744 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the separation of powers challenge, see Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the cruel or unusual punishment challenge, see Turner v. State, 745 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the due process challenges, see Turner v. State, Woods v. State; and the equal protection challenge, see Woods v. State.
The appellant also contends that section 775.082(8) is unconstitutionally vague because the legislature failed to define the terms “sufficient evidence,” “material witness,” the degree of materiality required, “extenuating circumstances,” and “just prosecution.” But it has long been recognized that words in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and the appellant has failed to identify how the plain language of the statute renders it impossible for a person of ordinary intelligence to read the statute and understand how the legislature intended these terms to apply to any particular defendant. We accordingly conclude that the appellant has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that the statutory language is unconstitutionally vague.
And the appellant contends that the statute violates double jeopardy because nothing in the statutory language forecloses a defendant from being both habitu-alized under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. But the appellant lacks standing to present this argument because he was not sentenced as a habitual felony offender. See Waterman v. State, 654 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
We do, however, find merit in the appellant’s argument that the trial court committed fundamental error in its written sentence by designating the sentence for felony petit theft as a prison releasee reof-fender sentence. Felony petit theft is not one of the statutorily enumerated offenses for which a prison releasee reoffender sentence may be lawfully imposed. Because the felony petit theft sentence fails to comport with this statutory limitation, the sentence is illegal and is reviewable on direct appeal as fundamental error. See Nelson v. State, 719 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
Accordingly, the appellant’s sentence for resisting arrest with violence is affirmed, his sentence for felony petit theft is vacated, and this case is remanded for the appellant to be resentenced for felony petit theft.
WEBSTER and BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR.
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Verro Chambers v. State, 752 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…usual punishment, because there is no possibility that the Act inflicts torture or a lingering death or the infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain.” See also Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1999). In this case, as in Crump v. State, 746 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), appellant lacks standing to present a double jeopardy challenge to the prison releasee reoffender punishment act, because he was not sentenced as an habitual felony offender. Appellant was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffend…
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Dickerson v. State, 783 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…to be resolved in favor of constitutionality, “a defendant who challenges the constitutional validity of a statute bears a heavy burden of establishing its invalidity.” Wright v. State, 739 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); see Crump v. State, 746 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (concluding that defendant failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the statutory language was unconstitutionally vague); Frear v. State, 700 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (stating that criminal statutes are presumed t…
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Branch v. State, 790 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…HE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? 740 So. 2d at 25. We certify the same question. Third, the Act is challenged as “void for vagueness” under the United States and Florida Constitutions. This argument was rejected in Woods, 740 So. 2d at 23; Crump v. State, 746 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Young v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. den., 727 So. 2d 915 (Fla.1999); and Turner, 745 So. 2d at 353. Fourth, the Act is alleged to be a violation of the due process guarantees of the United States and Flori…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Nelson v. State, 719 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Mundy v. State, 745 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Lamarian Jackson v. State, 744 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Waterman v. State, 654 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)