JOHN WILLIE STEWART, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
John Willie Stewart appealed the denial of his postconviction relief motion, challenging his seven-year sentences for two third-degree felony drug possession convictions. The appellate court held that Stewart's possession convictions were not subject to habitualization under Florida law, and therefore his sentences could not exceed five years, requiring resentencing and correction of his sentencing scoresheet.
Stewart's three-degree felony possession convictions are not subject to habitualization under Florida law, and his sentences may not exceed five years. Stewart must be resentenced on the possession charges with a properly computed scoresheet and with an opportunity for his counsel to review and challenge the documents relied upon by the State.
[1] A court may treat a postconviction relief motion as filed under the appropriate rule when it contains claims cognizable under multiple rules.
[2] Possession of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony, is not subject to habitual offender sentencing under section 775.084(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Stewart's third-degree felony convictions are for possession of a controlled substance and, as such, are not subject to habitualization pursuant to section 775.084(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), and his sentences for these convictions may not exceed five years under section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1993).”
Establishes the core legal holding that drug possession convictions cannot support habitual offender enhancement and are capped at five years.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStewart was convicted of two third-degree felonies for possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to seven years each as a habitual offender. …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Habitual Offender Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
John Willie Stewart appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Stewart’s claims included issues that were properly raised in a rule 3.850 motion and issues that should have been raised in a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 motion. The trial court addressed all of the issues identified by Stewart and entered two orders on them. This court has reviewed Stewart’s motion in its entirety and treats it as if filed pursuant to the appropriate rule. See Goutier v. State, 692 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Coleman v. State, 677 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
Stewart challenges his seven-year sentences for two third-degree felonies, contending that the sentences exceed the statutory maximum. The trial court ruled that the sentences were legal under the habitual offender statute. However, Stew art’s third-degree felony convictions are for possession of a controlled substance and, as such, are not subject to habitualization pursuant to section 775.084(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), and his sentences for these convictions may not exceed five years under section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1993). See Gregory v. State, 739 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Consequently, he must be resentenced on the possession charges.
Stewart also contends that his scoresheet included points for crimes for which he has not been convicted. A hearing on this claim was conducted on October 16, 1998. It appears from the transcript of the hearing that Stewart’s counsel was not given the opportunity to review the documents presented by the State to support Stewart’s sentence. This was error. Moreover, the order issued following the hearing does not reflect the oral pronouncement made by the trial court at the hearing.
In addition, it is impossible to determine from the record which offenses were relied on by the court to sentence Stewart as a habitual offender and which offenses were used in computing his scoresheet. It also appears that none of the judgments relied on by the court to sentence Stewart as a habitual offender were entered into evidence. Because Stewart must be given guidelines sentences on the possession charges, it is essential that his scoresheets be computed correctly and that his attorney be given the opportunity to review and challenge, if appropriate, the documents relied on by the State in completing the scoresheets.
Stewart’s remaining issues are without merit, and the trial court’s order is affirmed with regard to those issues.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
BLUE, A.C.J., and GREEN and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Byars v. State, 805 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…raised pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). See Baxter v. State, 769 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). This court has the authority to treat Byars’ motion as if it were filed pursuant to the appropriate rule. See Stewart v. State, 746 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In its order, the trial court gave no reasons for its denial of Byars’ claim. However, we affirm the order of the trial court because, in failing to allege that the sentence imposed was a departure under the 1994 sentencing gui…
Authorities Cited
- Goutier v. State, 692 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Gregory v. State, 739 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Coleman v. State, 677 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)