JIM AMOS, PETITIONER,
v.
L. F. CHAPMAN, SUPERINTENDENT STATE PRISON, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1933-02-21
108 Fla. 360 Florida Supreme Court (1933) Caution
Also reported at: 146- So. 98
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Jim Amos petitioned for habeas corpus challenging his conviction under Florida's larceny statute, arguing the indictment failed to allege ownership of the stolen property or that the owner's identity was unknown. The Florida Supreme Court held that while the indictment was technically defective and should have been quashed on motion, the defect was curable by verdict and did not warrant habeas corpus relief.


Holding

The Court held that although the indictment was defective and should have been quashed on motion, habeas corpus is not available because the indictment does not wholly fail to charge an offense. The defect was curable by verdict, and the proper remedy for such defects is writ of error, not habeas corpus.


Key Quotes

“We held in the case of Pippin v. State, 102 Fla. 1124, 136 Sou. 883, that indictments attempting to charge the offense denounced by this section should allege the ownership of the property involved or that the identity of the ownership is unknown.”

Establishes the prior precedent requiring ownership allegations in larceny indictments

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Facts & Procedural History

Amos was convicted in Circuit Court under Section 5055 R.G.S. (larceny statute as amended). He was detained in Florida State Prison and sought habeas …

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Opinion of the Court
Buford, J.

Buford, J.

In this case the writer issued a writ of habeas corpus returnable before himself as' a Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida.

Petitioner contends that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by being detained in the Florida State Prison *361under a sentence of the Circuit Court upon a conviction of the offense denounced by Section 5055 R. G. S., 7157 C. G. L., as amended by Chapter 13729, Acts of 1929. The point of contention is that the indictment fails to allege the ownership of the property involved or that the identity of the owner was to the grand jury unknown.

The charge is in language fully equivalent to the language of the statute.

We held in the case of Pippin v. State, 102 Fla. 1124, 136 Sou. 883, that indictments attempting to charge the offense denounced by this section should allege the ownership of the property involved or that the identity of the ownership is unknown. We there held that motion to quash an indictment so defective should prevail and reversed the judgment in that case on that ground. We did not hold that the indictment wholly failed to charge an offense. The charge made in this indictment was entirely adequate to advise the defendant of the particular act for which he was being prosecuted and to protect him from a subsequent prosecution for the same act after conviction or acquittal.

In Clifton v. State, 76 Fla. 244, 79 Sou. 707, this Court said:

“A motion in arrest of judgment reached only such errors as appear upon the record and when addressed to the indictment or information is effective only when they wholly fail to charge any offense or their allegations are so vague and uncertain as to embarrass the defendant in the preparation of his defense or expose him after acquittal or conviction to substantial danger of another prosecution for the same offense.”

The same rule applies to petition for habeas corpus.

We have repeatedly held that where an indictment or information does not wholly fail to state an offense under a valid statute habeas corpus is not available. Johnson *362v. State, 81 Fla. 783, 88 Sou. 474; Foxworth v. Law, 77 Fla. 596, 82 Sou. 55; Crooke v. Van Pelt, 76 Fla. 20, 79 Sou. 166; Spooner v. Curtis, 85 Fla. 408, 96 Sou. 836.

While we would hold that the indictment in this case should have been quashed on motion duly presented, we hold that the defect is' one which could be cured by verdict based upon proper testimony admitted without objection. If the infirmity was not cured by verdict based upon such evidence the proper method of presenting such questions for determination by this Court is by writ of error.

For the reasons stated, the writ of habeas’ corpus will be quashed and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the respondent to be dealt with according to law.

Rivers Buford,

Justice, Supreme Court of Florida.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Nesby Lawrence Gibbs v. Mayo, 81 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1955)
    …he cases cited by the State, such as Sinclair v. State, Fla.1950, 46 So. 2d 453; State ex rel. Linick v. Coleman, 144 Fla. 458, 198 So. 100; Overstreet v. State, 134 Fla. 715, 184 So. 485; Glidden v. Mayo, 128 Fla. 237, 174 So. 410; Amos v. Chapman, 108 Fla. 360, 146 So. 98; In re Robinson, 73 Fla. 1068, 75 So. 604, L.R.A.1918B, 1148. While the issue is a narrow one we think those cases are distinguishable in their facts from the instant case. We note also that in those cases the information under attack wa…
  • Taylor v. Chapman, 127 Fla. 401 (Fla. 1937)
    …e his defense and protects him from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, will not on habeas corpus be held so fatally defective as to render the judgment of conviction and commitment rendered thereon void and of no effect. Amos v. Chapman, 108 Fla. 360, 146 So. 98; State, ex rel. Moir v. Mayo, 121 Fla. 212, 163 So. 521; Johson v. State, 99 Fla. 711, 127 So. 317; Lehman v. Sawyer, 106 Fla. 396, 143 So. 310; Hepburn v. Chapman, 109 Fla. 133, 149 So. 196. The power to discharge from custody by writ o…
  • Glidden v. Honorable Nathan Mayo, 128 Fla. 237 (Fla. 1937)
    …but that it wholly fails to state an offense under the law. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a motion to quash or a writ of error or an appeal.” See also Ex Parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 Sou. 289, and Jim Amos v. Chapman, 108 Fla. 360, 146 Sou. 98, in which [*240] we held: “Indictment for robbery by person armed held sufficient, in habeas corpus proceedings, after conviction, notwithstanding omission to allege ownership of property involved (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, Sec. 7157, as am…

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