BARBARA E. DICKINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN C. DICKINSON, APPELLEE
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Barbara Dickinson appeals the dismissal of her motion to amend the final judgment in her dissolution of marriage. The court reversed, holding that her motion sought clarification and enforcement of the parties' agreement regarding pension distribution, not modification, and therefore the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider it.
The trial court erred in dismissing the motion. The former wife's motion sought clarification and enforcement of the parties' agreement regarding pension distribution, not modification of the agreement, so the trial court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the matter for purposes of clarification or declaratory relief.
[1] A motion to "amend" a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, seeking to enforce an agreed-upon distribution of pension proceeds, should be treated as a motion for cla…
[2] A court retains jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporates a marital settlement agreement.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the former wife filed a motion to "amend" the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the substance of her motion was a request for a clarification, rather than a modification. In other words, she is not seeking a new benefit, but rather, she is seeking to enforce that to which she believes the parties had agreed.”
Establishes the court's reasoning that the motion sought clarification/enforcement of existing terms, not modification
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' marital settlement agreement, incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution, provided in Paragraph 13 that the former husband's pen…
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PETERSON, J.
Barbara E. Dickinson, the former wife, appeals a final order dismissing with prejudice her motion to amend the parties’ final judgment of dissolution of marriage which incorporated their marital settlement agreement. Paragraph 13 of the marital settlement agreement provided that an order “shall be entered directing that the proceeds of [the former husband’s] pension plan shall be evenly distributed to the parties at the time it is distributed.” The court specifically retained jurisdiction over the matter and the parties for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the final judgment.
Four and one-half years later, the former wife filed a motion to “amend” the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, alleging that the parties neglected to indicate in their agreement that the pension plan referred to in Paragraph 13 was a federal retirement benefit. The former wife had apparently contacted the United States Office of Personnel Management (“Office”) with inquiries regarding her former husband’s pension benefits, and the Office refused to give out any information without a court order. The former wife, in her motion to amend the final judgment, further requested an order directing the Office to provide information regarding the status of the former husband’s pension benefits.
The former husband subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Paragraph 13 was part of the property settlement agreement and, therefore, not subject to modification. Notably, no allegations were made that the former wife was not entitled to one-half of the feder-. al pension. Ultimately, the lower court granted the former husband’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.
Although the former wife filed a motion to “amend” the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the substance of her motion was a request for a clarification, rather than a modification. In other words, she is not seeking a new benefit, but rather, she is seeking to enforce that to which she believes the parties had agreed. The lower court should have treated the former wife’s motion to amend as a motion for clarification or a petition for declaratory relief. E.g., Woolley v. Woolley, 637 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over former husband’s motion for clarification and enforcement of property settlement agreement incorporated into final judgment in dissolution proceeding since husband only sought to enforce the agreement according to its terms, rather than to modify it).
The trial court’s order of dismissal is reversed and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
W. SHARP, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 877 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…2d 945 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). This is just one of the hazards of appearing pro se at an eviden-tiary hearing. . Tinsley v. Tinsley, 490 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Semko v. Semko, 537 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). See also Dickinson v. Dickinson, 746 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). . Smilack v. Smilack, 858 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Woolley v. Woolley, 637 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).…
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Brendle v. Jennings, 138 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Dickinson v. Dickinson, 746 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). TORPY, C.J., EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.…
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Janovic v. Janovic, 814 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…re a party only seeks to receive what is contemplated by the property settlement agreement incorporated into the final dissolution judgment, the relief sought is enforcement rather than modification. See id. at 1121; see also Dickinson v. Dickinson, 746 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Therefore, a trial court may order an equivalent benefit as part of an enforcement action where one spouse takes a voluntary action which defeats the intent of the parties. See Longanecker, 782 So. 2d at 407-08.3 As recognized…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Woolley v. Woolley, 637 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)