ERIC G. ANDERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
ED MCGUFFEY FOR REBECCA MCGUFFEY, APPELLEE
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The court reversed an injunction for protection against repeat violence because the evidence showed no acts of violence as statutorily defined. The trial court erred in issuing the injunction based merely on the father's belief that the appellant was a bad influence on his daughter.
The court held that the trial court erred in entering the injunction because not a single act of violence within the statutory definition was offered in evidence. The injunction was reversed because the statutory requirements for repeat violence were not met.
[1] An injunction for protection against repeat violence requires evidence of at least two incidents of violence or stalking as defined by statute.
[2] The statutory definition of "violence" for the purpose of an injunction against repeat violence includes assault, battery, sexual battery, or stalking.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“'Repeat violence' means two incidents of violence or stalking committed by the respondent, one of whifeh must have been within 6 months of the filing of the petition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner's immediate family member.”
Establishes the statutory definition of repeat violence required to support an injunction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe respondent (Ed McGuffey, on behalf of his 16-year-old daughter Rebecca) sought an injunction against the 21-year-old appellant Eric Anderson. The …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant argues that no evidence supports the entry of an injunction for protection against repeat violence in this case.
We agree and reverse. Section 784.046, Florida Statutes (1997), authorizes an injunction for protection in cases of repeat violence and defines “violence” as “any assault, battery, sexual battery, or stalking by a person against any other person.” § 784.046(1)(a), Fla. Stat. “ ‘Repeat violence’ means two incidents of violence or stalking committed by the respondent, one of whifeh must have been within 6 months of the filing of the petition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate family member.” § 784.046(1)(b), Fla. Stat. In the instant case, the petitioner below sought issuance of an injunction on behalf of his sixteen year old daughter against the twenty-one year old appellant on the ground that appellant was a bad influence and because he believed that keeping appellant away from his daughter was in the girl’s best interest. Not one single act of violence within the statutory definition was offered in either the petition for the injunction or at the subsequent hearing at which the parties testified.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering the injunction, and we reverse. See Russell ex rel. Russell v. Hogan ex rel. Hogan, 738 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reversing entry of injunction for protection against repeat violence because only testimony was of one act of violence); Johnson v. Brooks, 567 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (reversing entry of injunction for protection against repeat violence because appellee had failed to demonstrate violence as required and defined by statute).
MINER, WOLF and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Ravitch v. Tess A. Whelan, 851 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…asis exists for granting injunctive relief based on the incidents cited in Whelan’s petition. No competent, substantial evidence exists that Whelan suffered any acts of violence or other prohibited conduct. See Anderson v. McGuffey ex rel. McGuffey, 746 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that statutory elements not met where no evidence of repeat violence exists); Russell ex rel. Russell v. Hogan ex rel. Hogan, 738 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s final judgment i…
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Long v. Edmundson, 827 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…icient to constitute an act of violence, it is the only qualifying act of violence either alleged in the petition or proved at the hearing. Thus, there was a total failure of proof that this was a repeat violence situation. See Anderson v. McGuffey, 746 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (citing Russell, 738 So. 2d at 1003). Because the trial court erred in entering the injunction, we reverse. FULMER and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur.…
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McMATH v. Biernacki, 776 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…o statutory basis exists for granting injunctive relief based on the incidents cited in the appellee’s petition. No competent, substantial evidence exists that the appellee suffered repeat acts of violence. See Anderson v. McGuffey ex rel. McGuffey, 746 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that statutory elements not met where no evidence of repeat violence exists); Russell ex rel. Russell v. Hogan ex rel. Hogan, 738 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Johnson, 567 So. 2d at 35. Accordingly, we reverse the tri…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Johnson v. Brooks, 567 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Russell v. Hogan, 738 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)