DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, APPELLANT,
v.
STEPHEN WEINSTEIN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Highway Patrol prevailed in a personal injury lawsuit and sought attorney's fees under section 768.79 after the plaintiff rejected a $1,000 settlement offer. The trial court denied fees, finding the offer was not made in good faith, but the appellate court reversed, holding that an offer satisfies the good faith requirement if the offeror had a reasonable basis in fact to believe its exposure was minimal, regardless of the offer's objective relationship to actual damages.
An offer of judgment satisfies the good faith requirement of section 768.79 if the offeror had a reasonable basis in fact—either in known facts or reasonably believed facts—to conclude that its exposure was nominal, regardless of whether the offer bears an objective relationship to the ultimate damages or represents a realistic assessment of liability. The good faith determination is subjective and depends on the offeror's reasonable motivations and beliefs, not an objective assessment of both parties' positions.
[1] An offer of judgment is made in "good faith" under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, when the offeror has a reasonable basis to conclude that its exposure is nominal.
[2] The "good faith" of an offer of judgment is determined by the subjective motivations and beliefs of the offeror.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the [offeror] ... had a reasonable basis ... to conclude that [its] exposure was nominal.”
Establishes the test for good faith: whether the offeror had a reasonable factual basis to believe its liability exposure was minimal, regardless of the offer amount.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant Florida Highway Patrol made a $1,000 offer of judgment shortly after a personal injury case was filed. The plaintiff, Stephen Weinstein,…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Good Faith Offer cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
After it won a jury verdict and resulting judgment in a personal injury action, the Florida Highway Patrol, the defendant below, applied for attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995), because the plaintiff had rejected a $1000.00 offer of judgment made soon after the case was filed. The trial judge denied relief on the ground that the offer had not been made “in good faith” within the meaning of the statute. We reverse.
In our judgment, although the offer was essentially nominal, the record demonstrates conclusively that, at the time it was made, “the [offeror] ... had a reasonable basis ... to conclude that [its] exposure was nominal.”[emphasis supplied] Fox v. McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., 745 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Specifically, the defendant could reasonably believe, as it stated it did believe, either because of a late notice which would have precluded relief under section 768.79, or because its investigation revealed substantial evidence that its trooper had not, as alleged, been guilty of any causative negligence, or both, that it was not liable at all, so that the case was worth no more than a nuisance amount to settle. This factual conclusion — that there was a “reasonable foundation,” Eagleman v. Eagleman, 673 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), or a “reasonable explanation,” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse, 715 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), for the offer— equates to the legal conclusion that it was made in good faith under the statute and thus that the appellant is entitled to fees. See Deltona House Rentals, Inc. v. Cloer, 734 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Evans v. Piotraczk, 724 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Silow, 714 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Weesner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 711 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So. 2d 914 (Fla.1999); Eagleman v. Eagleman, 673 So. 2d at 946; Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); see also City of Neptune Beach v. Smith, 740 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko, 695 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. Acme Gas Corp., 689 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Lennar Corp. v. Muskat, 595 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), review denied, 606 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.1992).
In respectively holding and arguing otherwise, the trial court and the appellee, relying mostly on language in Eagleman, that a “good faith” offer must be based on an objective assessment of the positions of both parties. We disagree. As the cited cases reflect, this, like every other issue of “good faith,” is, by its very nature, determined by the subjective motivations and beliefs of the pertinent actor. As is true in this case, so long as the offeror has a basis in known or reasonably believed fact to conclude that the offer is justifiable, the “good faith” requirement has been satisfied. The holding of Eagleman, 673 So. 2d at 946, that there was no reasonable foundation on which to base that offer, is not to the contrary. For the reasons we have indicated, however, we disagree with dicta which indicates the offer was invalid because it
bore no reasonable relationship to the amount of damages or realistic assessment of liability [and] was instead based on defendant’s unilateral belief and subjective determination, before discovery had commenced, that this was a case of no liability, [emphasis supplied]
Eagleman, 673 So. 2d at 948.
Our holding does not discount the likelihood that the plaintiff was justified in rejecting the offer. As he testified below:
I sustained six and seven vertebrae damage. I am considering an operation that will cost in excess of $30,000. I have sustained damages businesswise of over a quarter of a million dollars and I got an offer of $1,000.
However, although it is highly significant in determining the amount of fees to be awarded after remand, this consideration is irrelevant to the entitlement issue now before us. TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla.1995); City of Neptune Beach v. Smith, 740 So. 2d at 25.
The order denying fees is therefore reversed and the cause remanded with directions to make an appropriate award for the appellant’s attorney’s fees.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (20 total)
-
Ryan v. Leonor Lobo de Gonzalez and Jorge Gonzalez, 841 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…ns on whether the offeror had a reasonable foundation upon which to make his offer and whether it was made with the intent to settle the claim should the offer be accepted); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Fla. Highway Patrol v. Weinstein, 747 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Defendants argue that they made the offers in good faith, because at the time they believed the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations defense. They indicate that this was a reasonable assessment of t…
-
Wagner v. Brandeberry, 761 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…ntirely on whether the offeror had a reasonable foundation upon which to make his offer and made it with the intent to settle the claim against the offeree should the offer be accepted. See Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Weinstein, 747 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“This factual conclusion — that there was a ‘reasonable foundation,’ or a ‘reasonable explanation’ for the offer— equates to the legal conclusion that it was made in good faith under the statute. ...”); City of Neptune Beac…
-
Stephen A. Levine, PH.D. v. Harris, 791 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…ether the offeror had a reasonable foundation upon which to make his offer and made it with the intent to settle the claim against the offeree should the offer be accepted); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Fla. Highway Patrol v. Weinstein, 747 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). A review of the record reflects that Appellants had a reasonable foundation upon which to make a $500 offer despite the trial judge labeling it “the proverbial drop in the bucket.” Notably, Steven Katz, who was the only ex…
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995)
- Susanne Rae Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Eagleman v. Atilla Eagleman, 673 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Ira FOX v. McCAW Cellular Commc'ns OF Fla., Inc., 745 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko, 695 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Martinez v. Irwin Lichter and Lourdes Pons, 689 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Weesner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 711 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Evans v. Piotraczk, 724 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Silow, 714 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Deltona House Rentals, Inc. v. Cloer, 734 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)