STANLEY S. KRAUS, APPELLANT,
v.
SHEILA J. KRAUS, APPELLEE
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In this interlocutory appeal from a temporary alimony increase order, the Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that the wife demonstrated increased need for additional alimony, but reversed and remanded regarding the retroactive application date, holding that retroactive support can only relate back to when the request for increase was filed, not to an earlier agreement date.
The court affirmed that substantial competent evidence supported an increased need for alimony, but reversed the retroactive application date. The court held that when a trial court awards retroactive temporary support, it is limited to the date the request for increase was filed, not to an earlier agreement date.
[1] An award of increased temporary alimony is permissible when substantial competent evidence demonstrates an increased need by the recipient spouse.
[2] An order for temporary alimony, like other court orders, is generally final during its lifespan and should not be subject to continuous relitigation absent compelling cir…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“generally even an order of temporary alimony is final during its lifespan. Not only should the parties be entitled to rely upon the court's order, but, additionally, the trial court should be required to use its resources only once on the identical issue.”
Establishes the principle that temporary alimony orders are entitled to finality and parties should not be able to relitigate the same issue
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Krauses were married on November 10, 1973. On February 5, 1997, the parties agreed to and the trial court awarded temporary alimony of $2,400 per …
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CASANUEVA, Judge.
In this interlocutory appeal from an order awarding increased temporary alimony, the husband, Stanley S. Kraus, contends the trial court committed two errors. He claims, first, that Mrs. Kraus’ evidence did not support an increased need for alimony since the initial order for temporary alimony; and, second, that the increased temporary alimony award should not be retroactive to a date before Mrs. Kraus filed her motion for increased temporary alimony. We affirm the trial court on the first issue because there was substantial competent evidence showing an increased need. However, under these facts, we conclude the trial court erred in making the increased award retroactive to the date it did.
The parties were married on November 10, 1973. At the time Mrs. Kraus commenced dissolution proceedings, her financial affidavit indicated a need for monthly temporary alimony of $2400. She moved for temporary alimony and on February 5, 1997, the parties reached agreement on this figure. By order dated February 27, 1997, the' trial court awarded her temporary alimony of $2400 per month. Over a year later, on May 29, 1998, she filed a motion for increased temporary alimony. After an evidentiary hearing, the court increased her temporary alimony by $800 per month and made the award retroactive to February 5, 1997. It thereby instantly created an arrearage of $14, 400 where none had previously existed.
Initially, we observe that generally even an order of temporary alimony is final during its lifespan.- Not only should the parties be entitled to rely upon the court’s order, but, additionally, the trial court should be required to use its resources only once on the identical issue. Were this not so, a litigant would continuously bombard the courts with new requests based solely upon facts that the court had already considered for its ruling. Even temporary awards are entitled to a measure of finality absent compelling circumstances that we do not find in this case.
In Warner v. Warner, 692 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the wife sought an increase in the amount of temporary child support previously awarded. The appellate court held the retroactive increase in temporary support could relate back only to the date the wife filed her request for increased temporary support. At that point, the husband was placed on notice that an increase in support was being sought. We agree with the reasoning of Warner and determine that it likewise applies in this instance.
Therefore, we conclude it was error to make the award retroactive to February 5, 1997. When the trial court awards retroactive support, it is limited to the date the request was filed, here, May 29, 1998. This holding is consistent with the general rule that parties are not permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. See James v. James, 84 So. 2d 914 (Fla.1956) (citing Brickell v. Graves Inv. Co., 150 Fla. 785, 9 So. 2d 788 (1942)).
Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment as to the $800 per month increase in temporary support but reverse as to the amount of arrearage. We remand for a recalculation of the arrearage in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
WHATLEY, A.C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J., Concur.
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Sunil Ghay v. Poonam Ghay, 954 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…Cunningham v. Cunningham, 918 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). . The legislature added this provision to section 61.14 effective July 1, 2004, ch.2004-47, Laws of Fla., in direct response to cases such as this court’s opinion in Kraus v. Kraus, 749 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which suggested that temporary support orders enjoyed some level of finality even before the entry of a final judgment. See Senate Staff Analysis & Economic Impact Statement, Senate Bill 1060, Regular Session (Fla. Mar. 16, 2004)…
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Murphy v. Murphy, 948 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…rt obligation had been reduced by a prior temporary order. In support of his argument, the former husband cites to Rodgers v. Diederichsen, 820 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), Israel v. Israel, 824 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and Kraus v. Kraus, 749 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). However, these decisions were rendered prior to the enactment of section 61.14(11), Florida Statutes. This statute became effective on July 1, 2004, and specifically provides: (ll)(a) A court may, upon good cause shown, and with…
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Dent v. Dent, 851 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…es are without prejudice to these issues being revisited during a final hearing. This court has previously observed that generally, “absent compelling circumstances,” an order for temporary support is “final during its lifespan.” See Kraus v. Kraus, 749 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing with approval Warner v. Warner, 692 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); see also Israel v. Israel, 824 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). As such, a circuit court that anticipates that its temporary support orders may need to be…1 / 3
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Warner v. Warner, 692 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Belle G. Brickell v. Graves Inv. Co., 150 Fla. 785 (Fla. 1942)
- James v. James, 84 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1956)