RONALD SNEED, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2000-01-05
No. 98-2111
DELL and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
749 So. 2d 545 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2000) Caution
Cited by 34 cases

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Synopsis

Ronald Sneed was convicted of attempted possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia. The trial court initially sentenced him to time served, mistakenly believing attempted cocaine possession was a misdemeanor. When the court discovered it was actually a felony, it vacated the sentence and resentenced him to 140.4 months in prison. The appellate court reversed, holding that resentencing after a sentence has been served violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.


Holding

The court held that imposition of the second sentence constituted double jeopardy and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Where a sentence has already been served, the trial court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence.


Headnotes

[1] A violation of double jeopardy principles is fundamental error and may be raised for the first time on appeal.

[2] Where a sentence has already been served, a court lacks jurisdiction and violates the Double Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence.

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Key Quotes

“Where a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence.”

Establishes the core holding that resentencing after a sentence is served violates double jeopardy.

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Facts & Procedural History

A jury found Sneed guilty of attempted possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court adjudicated him guilty and sentence…

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Opinion of the Court
WARNER, C.J.

WARNER, C.J.

A jury found appellant guilty of attempted possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Immediately after the verdict, the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty of both offenses, and thinking both charges were misdemeanors sentenced the appellant to time served with the agreement of the state.1 The next day the trial court vacated the judgment and sentence and subsequently held a hearing, because the court and the state were wrong in their conclusion that attempted possession of cocaine was a misdemeanor. In fact, it was a felony. At the second sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to 140.4 months in prison. Appellant claims that imposition of the second sentence constituted double jeopardy. We agree and reverse.

Although the appellant did not raise a double jeopardy challenge at the trial level to his resentencing, a violation of double jeopardy principles is fundamental error and may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Acosta v. State, 489 So. 2d 63, 63 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(citing State v. Johnson, 483 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla.1986)). In the instant case, the court adjudicated the appellant and sentenced him to time served. Thus, by the time the court realized its mistake, appellant’s sentence had already been served. Moreover, where a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence. See Palmer v. State, 182 So. 2d 625, 626-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); of. United States v. Silvers, 90 F. 3d 95, 101 (4th Cir.1996). In Palmer, this court quoted with approval from 8 R.C.L., Criminal Laws, § 247 that:

“Where a judgment has been fully satisfied by the defendant, the trial court has no power to amend it by increasing the punishment after the term at which the judgment was rendered, or even during the same term. The ends of justice will not be served by permitting the state, after the sentence of the law has been discharged, to open the case for any purpose and least of all to insert an additional penalty. To permit this would be like punishing the delinquent the second time for the same offense.”

182 So. 2d at 626 (emphasis added). In a footnote we also noted that an invalid sentence that has been served will not be set aside, because the question has become moot. See id. at 626 n. 2.

We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate the second sentence and to discharge the defendant from custody on that charge. He, of course, remains in custody on his other judgment and sentence.

DELL and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. . The record reflects that appellant had also been convicted of another crime for which he was already serving a fifteen year sentence.


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Citator

Cited By (18 total)

  • Maybin v. State, 884 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …dy been served, even if it is an illegal sentence or an invalid sentence, the trial court loses jurisdiction and violates the Double Jeopardy Clause by reasserting jurisdiction and resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence. Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Even though Maybin’s modified sentence was invalid, he had already served it to completion, and the trial court could not set it aside because the question had become moot. See id. at 546. Therefore, the trial court’s reimposit…
  • Willingham v. State, 833 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …rdy Clause. We agree. “[W]here a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence.” Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). As in Sneed, the defendant had actually served his sentence on the two misdemeanor charges upon completion of the sentencing hearing. The trial court properly corrected the illegal seven year sentence on the battery on a la…
  • Clark v. State, 72 So. 3d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
    …court loses jurisdiction and violates the Double Jeopardy Clause by reasserting jurisdiction and resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence.” Maybin v. State, 884 So. 2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (emphasis added) (citing Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)).…

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