AUTO-OWNERS INS. CO., APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM CLYDE CHRISTOPHER AND TINA QUINN, ETC., APPELLEES
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Auto-Owners Insurance Company appeals a summary judgment awarding uninsured motorist coverage to its insureds for an accident involving a motorcycle that was not listed on the policy and for which no additional premium was paid. The court reversed, holding that the policy's exclusion for vehicles not shown on the Declarations page with paid premiums clearly bars coverage and creates no ambiguity.
The court held that coverage does not apply. The policy's exclusion provision clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for bodily injury while occupying a motor vehicle owned by a relative unless a premium for that vehicle is shown in the Declarations, and this exclusion does not create an ambiguity with the general coverage statement.
[1] An insurance policy exclusion is not rendered ambiguous merely because it limits the scope of a general coverage provision.
[2] Uninsured motorist coverage for a relative living with the insured does not extend to a vehicle owned by the relative if no premium has been paid for that specific vehicl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This coverage does not apply ... (e) to bodily injury to any person while occupying or getting in or out of a motor vehicle owned by you or a relative living with you unless a premium for this coverage is shovm in the Declarations for that motor vehicle”
The policy exclusion at issue that bars coverage for vehicles not listed on the Declarations with paid premiums
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam Christopher, son of policyholder Tina Quinn, was injured while riding Quinn's 1985 Yamaha motorcycle in an accident with an uninsured motorist…
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Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners) appeals from a final summary judgment rendered by the trial court against it and in favor of its insureds, Tina Quinn and her son, William Christopher. The court ruled that coverage existed for Christopher under Auto-Owners’ policy, which had been issued to Quinn. Both parties agree this is a ruling based entirely on the interpretation of the insurance policy language. We disagree with the trial court and reverse. Christopher was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist while he was riding a 1985 Yamaha motorcycle, which was owned by Quinn. It was not listed as a covered motor vehicle under his mother’s policy with Auto-Owners. With regard to Uninsured Motorist Coverage, the policy provided:
If you are an individual, we extend this coverage. We will pay bodily injury damages which you are legally entitled to recover from the owner or driver of any uninsured motor vehicle. We give this same protection to any relative living with you who does not own a car. There was no dispute that Christopher did not own a car, or that he was a relative who lived with Quinn.
However, immediately following the above-quoted statement of uninsured motorist coverage, there appears the following Exclusion:
This coverage does not apply ...
* * *
(e) to bodily injury to any person while occupying or getting in or out of a motor vehicle owned by you or a relative living with you unless a premium for this coverage is shovm in the Declarations for that motor vehicle, (emphasis supplied.)
It was also undisputed that Quinn had not paid an additional premium for coverage of her motorcycle, and it was not shown as covered on the Declarations page.
The insureds argue that the exclusion is contradictory to the statement of coverage, thus creating an ambiguity in the policy which should be construed in favor of the insureds. Purrelli v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 698 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). However, this is not a situation where the exclusion in the policy completely swallows the insuring provision. Compare Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. First Southern Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 885, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 589 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1991). Had Christopher been riding his neighbor’s motorcycle and been injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist, he would have been covered by this policy.
We find no ambiguity in the exclusion and statement of coverage in this policy. An exclusion is always somewhat in conflict with the general statement of coverage, to a degree. Inter-Active Services v. Heathrow Master Ass’n, Inc., 721 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Here, the exclusion has the effect of encouraging the insured to pay a premium for every vehicle owned, or to put it another way, not to allow an insured to purchase one policy and expect all the insured’s other vehicles to be covered as well. Although this may be described as a trap for the unwary and contrary to Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla.1971), and the philosophy of coverage set forth in that opinion, the Legislature has specifically approved this exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage.1 Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment for Auto-Owners.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. . § 627.727(9)(d), Fla. Slat. See. Mangual v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 719 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
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The Warwick Corp. v. Turetsky, 227 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…g policy illusory where it covered parasailing but excluded watercrafts). On the other hand, where a limitation on coverage does not “completely swallow[] the insuring provision,” the policy is not illusory. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Christopher, 749 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). For example, in Interline Brands, Inc. v. Chartis Specialty Insurance Co., 749 F. 3d 962 (11th Cir. 2014), the insured, a product distribution and marketing corporation, purchased a policy that covered advertising injury. H…
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State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wilson (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)…t of encouraging the insured to pay a premium for every vehicle owned, or to put it another way, not to allow an insured to purchase one policy and expect all the insured's other vehicles to be covered as well." Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Christopher, 749 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The Trial Court was Bound by Larusso As an initial and dispositive point, the trial court reversibly erred by failing to follow Larusso. The facts of Larusso are indistinguishable from those at hand: the insured executed a…
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Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Boyce, 821 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…nition. See Grant, 638 So. 2d 936 (applying definition of motor vehicle under section 324.021(1) where section of policy dealing with uninsured motor vehicle coverage did not contain definition of motor vehicle); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Christopher, 749 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). We reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment for Progressive on its motion for summary judgment. Reversed and remanded. NORTHCUTT and COVINGTON, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971)
- Inter-Active Servs., Inc. v. Heathrow Master Ass'n, Inc., 721 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Postell v. State, 698 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. First S. Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Mangual v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 719 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)