JOSHUA PETER VITANZO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joshua Vitanzo appealed his sentencing for community control violations, challenging the trial court's assessment of 24 community sanction violation points. The First District Court of Appeal agreed that the court improperly multiplied points across multiple cases and cases sentenced under the same scoresheet, and reversed for resentencing with the correct 18-point assessment.
Yes. The trial court erred in assessing 24 community sanction violation points. Under Florida law, multiple counts or cases of community sanction violations cannot be used to multiply points. Vitanzo was properly assessed 12 points for the grand theft conviction while on probation and 6 points (not 12) for the community control violations across both cases, totaling 18 points.
[1] The existence of multiple counts or cases of community sanction violations shall not be a basis for multiplying points.
[2] A trial court errs by improperly assessing community sanction violation points when multiple counts or cases are used to multiply such points.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the existence of multiple counts (or cases) of community sanction violations shall not be a basis for multiplying points”
Establishes the core legal principle that prevents the trial court from assessing violation points separately for each case when they involve the same violation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVitanzo was charged with grand theft auto and burglary in case 96-5129, sentenced to six months' probation. He later violated probation and was senten…
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BROWNING, J.
Appellant, Joshua Vitanzo (Vitanzo), appeals his sentence, arguing the trial court erred by imposing twenty-four, rather than eighteen, community sanction violation points against him upon resentencing in two cases for a violation of community control. We agree and reverse for resentencing.
Vitanzo was charged with grand theft auto and burglary of a dwelling in case no. 96-5129. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Vitanzo was sentenced to six months’ probation. An affidavit for violation of probation was filed in case no. 96-5129. Before disposition of the violation of probation, Vitanzo was charged with grand theft of auto in case no. 98-1286. A single hearing was held on the violation of probation and the grand theft auto cases. Vitanzo pled no contest to the probation violation, his probation was revoked in case no. 96-5129, and he was sentenced to twelve months of community control. Vitanzo entered a plea agreement in case no. 98-1286 whereby he was placed on twelve months of community control, concurrent with the community control imposed for the violation of probation.
Subsequently, an affidavit for violation of community control was filed in both cases. A hearing was held and Vitanzo pled no contest to the community control violations. The trial court assessed 58.9 points on Vitanzo’s scoresheet for a sentencing range of 23.1 to 38.6 months. Included in the total points were twelve community sanction violation points for the conviction of grand theft auto, a felony, while on probation, and six points for violation of community control for each case (nos. 96-5129 and 98-1286), for a total of twenty-four community sanction violation points. Vitanzo objected to the use of the scoresheet, arguing his community sanction violation points should be eighteen rather than twenty-four, because six points were improperly assessed for each case rather than six points for both of the cases sentenced under the same scoresheet. Vi-tanzo’s argument is correct, and we reverse.
Community sanction violation points are authorized when an offender is found to have violated a condition of probation, community control, or pretrial intervention or diversion. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.703(d)(17). However, the existence of multiple counts (or eases) of community sanction violations shall not be a basis for multiplying points. § 921.0024(1)0»), F.S. (1997); see also Brown v. State, 741 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (on mot. for reh’g.).
In the case at bar, twelve community sanction violation points were authorized when Vitanzo was convicted of grand theft auto, a felony, while on probation. Six community sanction violation points were authorized when Vitanzo violated his community control in both cases. Multiple counts or cases cannot be used to multiply community sanction violation points and, thus, the trial court was authorized to assess only eighteen community sanction violation points against Vitanzo for sentencing. Where a guidelines score-sheet error results in a reduced sentencing range of one cell or more, the sentence must be reversed and remanded for resentencing based on a correctly calculated scoresheet. Burrows v. State, 649 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing consistent with this opinion.
WOLF and DAVIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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Perry v. State, 858 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…e his current fifteen-year sentence beyond the permitted sentencing range of five- and-a-half to twelve years. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to reversal on this claim. See Hummel v. State, 782 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Vitanzo v. State, 750 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); see also Desue v. State, 605 So. 2d 933, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order in regards to the appellant’s first three claims, but reverse the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s fou…
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Gonzales v. State, 779 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Drayton v. State, 744 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Horn v. State, 736 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); White v. State, 728 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Carter v. State, 705 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Vitanzo v. State, 750 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Hayes v. State, 748 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Campbell v. State, 745 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Hyman v. State, 744 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Spioch v. State, 742 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Jimerson v. Stat…
Authorities Cited
- Burrows v. State, 649 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Normando R. Brown v. State, 741 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)