ADAM FRANK SEARLES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Adam Frank Searles was convicted of three counts of DUI manslaughter and related offenses, but the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed his convictions because the administrative rule governing blood sample collection, storage, and transportation was inadequate under Florida law, requiring a new trial.
The court reversed Searles' convictions because administrative rule 11D-8.012 was inadequate regarding proper collection, storage, and transportation of blood samples. On remand, the State may reintroduce blood-alcohol test results if it meets the three-pronged predicate test from Robertson v. State and provides proper expert testimony. If such evidence is admitted, the State is entitled to statutory presumptions of impairment, but the court certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether the State is entitled to these presumptions once it establishes the Robertson predicate.
[1] A state may seek review of a pretrial evidentiary ruling in a DUI case via a petition for writ of certiorari.
[2] Administrative rules governing blood-alcohol sample collection, storage, and analysis may be deemed inadequate if they fail to ensure the reliability of test results.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“this court adopted the holding of the First District's opinion in State v. Miles, 732 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and held that the rule was inadequate”
Establishes the basis for reversal—that the administrative rule governing blood sample handling was constitutionally or statutorily inadequate.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSearles was convicted of three counts of DUI manslaughter, two counts of DUI with damage to a person, one count of DUI with serious bodily injury, and…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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BLUE, Acting Chief Judge.
Adam Frank Searles appeals his convictions and sentences for three counts of DUI manslaughter, two counts of DUI with damage to a person, one count of DUI with serious bodily injury, and one count of DUI with damage to property. He raises several issues on appeal concerning his trial and sentencing. Because we are reversing on one issue, as explained below, we do not reach the other issues on appeal.
Searles argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions in li-mine to exclude the blood-alcohol test results. Searles contends that rule 11D-8.012, Florida Administrative Code, fails to sufficiently provide for the proper collection, storage and transportation of blood samples taken pursuant to the implied consent law. In State v. Townsend, 746 So. 2d 495, (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), this court adopted the holding of the First District’s opinion in State v. Miles, 732 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and held that the rule was inadequate. Accordingly, on this issue, we reverse Searles’ convictions and remand for a new trial. We point out that this case factually demonstrates some of the deficiencies in the rule because the law enforcement officer took possession of the blood sample for a weekend, left it unrefrigerated, then delivered it to the lab for testing on Monday. In the new trial, the State may again introduce the blood-alcohol test results if it meets the three-prong predicate for admission of such evidence. See Robertson v. State, 604 So. 2d 783 (Fla.1992) (requiring proof that test was reliable, performed by qualified operator with proper equipment, and expert testimony as to test’s meaning). If such evidence is admitted, the State shall be entitled to the jury instructions regarding the statutory presumptions of impairment found in section 316.1934(2), Florida Statutes (1993). See Townsend. See also Miles.
As we did in Townsend, and as the First District did in Miles, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:
WHERE THE STATE LAYS THE THREE-PRONGED PREDICATE FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN ROBERTSON V. STATE, 604 So. 2d 783 (Fla.1992), THEREBY ESTABLISHING THE SCIENTIFIC RELIABILITY OF THE BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS, IS THE STATE ENTITLED TO THE LEGISLATIVELY CREATED PRESUMPTIONS OF IMPAIRMENT?
See Miles, 732 So. 2d at 353.
Reversed and remanded for new trial; question certified.
FULMER and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Searles v. State, 816 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…a person, and one count of DUI with damage to property. These judgments and sentences were entered following a jury trial in April 2000. This court reversed prior convictions for these offenses in 1999 and ordered a new trial. See Searles v. State, 750 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We now conclude that any errors during the new trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm. On July 8, 1994, Mr. Searles drove his car at a very high rate of speed into the rear of a station wagon…
Authorities Cited
- Robertson v. State, 604 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1992)
- Lamb v. State, 732 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- State v. Miles, 732 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Ingold v. State, 746 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)