ANNIKA MARIA ELMLUND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF LENNART ELMLUND, DECEASED AND ON BEHALF OF SURVIVING CHILDREN, ANNA MALIN ELMLUND, VICKTORIA MARIA ELMLUND, AND GUSTAV FREDRIK ELMLUND, APPELLANT,
v.
DR. MARK STEPHEN MOTTERSHEAD, CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, APPELLEES
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The estate of a cruise passenger who died allegedly due to maltreatment by the ship's physician sought damages against the physician, Dr. Mottershead, an English-licensed doctor. The trial court dismissed the action against Dr. Mottershead for lack of personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, and the appellate court affirmed, finding insufficient contacts with Florida to establish jurisdiction.
Florida's long-arm statute did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Dr. Mottershead because neither statutory provision applied: under section 48.193(1)(a), there was no nexus between the claim (arising from conduct on the high seas) and any Florida business activity; and under section 48.193(2), his incidental personal contacts with Florida between voyages did not constitute the 'substantial and non-isolated activities' required for jurisdiction.
[1] A plaintiff must establish a connection between the defendant's business activities in Florida and the cause of action to establish long-arm jurisdiction under section 48…
[2] A defendant's incidental, personal contacts with Florida between voyages are insufficient to establish the substantial and non-isolated activities required for long-arm j…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there is no connexity under section 48.193(l)(a) between the present claim, which arose during the doctor's discrete, non-Florida activities on the high seas, and whatever he did in Florida”
Establishes that the nexus requirement was not satisfied because the malpractice claim arose from conduct on the high seas, not from any Florida business activity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLennart Elmlund died while a passenger on a Carnival cruise liner operating out of Miami, allegedly due to maltreatment by the ship's physician, Dr. M…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Lennhart Elmlund died while a passenger on a Carnival cruise liner operating out of Miami, allegedly as a result of maltreatment by the ship’s physician, Dr. Mark Steven Mottershead. Elmlund’s survivors sued Carnival and Dr. Motters-head, an English citizen licenced to practice only in the United Kingdom, in the Dade County Circuit Court. In the order now under review, the trial court dismissed the action as against Dr. Motters-head on the ground that there was no basis for the Florida long arm jurisdiction attempted upon him.1 We agree and affirm.
To make a long story short enough for these purposes, of the two possible statutory bases for substituted service on the appellee, section 48.193(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires doing “business ... in this state,” and “connexity” between that business and the asserted cause of action, while section 48.193(2), in lieu of connexity, requires a substantially heightened degree of Florida activity. See Ranger Nationwide, Inc. v. Cook, 519 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Because (a) there is no connexity under section 48.193(l)(a) between the present claim, which arose during the doctor’s discrete, non-Florida activities on the high seas, and whatever he did in Florida,2 and (b) his incidental, almost entirely personal contacts with this state between voyages come nowhere close to the “substantial and non-isolated activities] within this state” required by section 48.193(2),3 see American Overseas Marine Corp. v. Patterson, 632 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Spanier v. Suisse-Outremer Reederei A.G., 557 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Ranger Nationwide, Inc., 519 So. 2d at 1087, it is clear that neither statute applies to the present circumstances. See also New York Marine Managers, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co., 746 F.Supp. 95 (S.D.Fla.1990); Pollard v. Steel Systems Constr. Co., Inc., 581 F.Supp. 1551 (S.D.Fla.1984); Milberg Factors, Inc. v. Greenbaum, 585 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Affirmed.
. The case against Carnival remains pending below.
. In light of these determinations, it is unnecessary directly to pass upon the very problematic issues of whether his activities constituted even doing business under section 48.193(l)(a) or satisfied the minimum contacts requirement of the constitution.
.Id.
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Banco De Los Trabajadores v. Cortez Moreno, 237 So. 3d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…z has not met the connexity requirement conferring jurisdiction to adjudicate Cortez’s assault and battery tort, Bantrab’s business activities are irrelevant. Small v. Chicola, 929 So. 2d 1122, 1125 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Elmlund v. Mottershead, 750 So. 2d 736, 737 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Therefore, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s order concluding that it had specific jurisdiction over Bantrab under Florida’s long-arm statute to adjudicate Count VIII. 2. Florida RICO (Count XVI) In Count…
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Radcliffe v. Gyves, 902 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…a is their sporadic or occasional family vacations, which we find to be insufficient. See Seabra v. Int’l Specialty Imps., Inc., 869 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Bafitis v. Ara, 815 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Elmlund v. Mottershead, 750 So. 2d 736, 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Musiker v. Projectavision, Inc., 960 F.Supp. 292 (S.D.Fla.1997). As the Shareholders have failed to meet both prongs of the long-arm jurisdiction analysis, we consequently reverse the trial court’s denial of the Motion to D…1 / 2
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Darce Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…practical realities of effectuating service of process. See, e.g., Rana v. Flynn, 823 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(personal jurisdiction present where treatment in Florida waters and there were multiple contacts with state); Elmlund v. Mottershead, 750 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(no personal jurisdiction over non-resident ship’s doctor with insufficient Florida contacts); Rossa v. Sills, 493 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction). Two years after this matter w…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Am. Overseas Marine Corp. v. Patterson, 632 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Ranger Nationwide, Inc. v. Cook, 519 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Milberg Factors, Inc. v. Greenbaum, 585 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Reinhold Spanier v. Suisse-Outremer Reederei A.G., 557 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Pollard v. Steel Sys. Const. Co., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
- N.Y. Marine Managers, Inc. v. Maitland Bros., 746 F. Supp. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1990)