RICHARD QUINN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) is constitutional because legislative bodies can dispense with a scienter element in regulatory statutes.
Richard Quinn was convicted for failure to register as a sex offender. He appealed, arguing the statute was facially unconstitutional for lacking a sc…
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POLEN, J.
Richard Quinn appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. We affirm.
Quinn argues section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) is facially unconstitutional because it fails to contain a scienter or guilty knowledge element.1 While the presence of a mens rea or guilty mind has long been a requirement of criminal responsibility, legislative bodies have the power to dispense with the element of intent and punish particular acts without regard to a malicious or wrongful mental attitude. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971). This principle was recognized in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922), in which Chief Justice Taft addressed a defendant’s claim he did not know that drugs he sold were covered by a federal act, and concluded: “Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided.” Id. at 254, 42 S.Ct. 301.
Chief Justice Taft’s reasoning is equally applicable here. We conclude the Florida legislature weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent unregistered offender to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent citizens to danger from repeat sexual offenders, and concluded the latter was the result preferably to be avoided.
Because section 943.0435 is a regulatory statute, we find Quinn’s second point equally unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
WARNER, C.J., and GROSS, J., concur. . Quinn’s reliance on Lambert v. People, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957) is misplaced because that case addressed an "as applied” challenge to a felon registration ordinance. See id. at 226-27, 78 S.Ct. 240.
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Simmons v. State, 753 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…clearly been met. However, the second prong has not been met because the statute does not alter the definition of criminal conduct and does not constitute punishment. We have stated that section 943.0435 is a regulatory statute. See Quinn v. State, 751 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Regulatory statutes do not constitute punishment. See generally Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So. 2d 1124 (Fla.1998). In addition, the reporting requirements as well as the notifica…
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Giorgetti v. State, 821 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…s rea, intent, or scienter need not be proved by the state to show a violation of the sexual offender registration statutes. In affirming we merely cited our prior decisions in Simmons v. State, 753 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) and Quinn v. State, 751 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Quinn decided the constitutional issue and held that section 943.0435 was not invalid in failing to contain an explicit textual requirement of scienter or an element of guilty knowledge. Simmons simply follows Quinn in that hold…1 / 2
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Dreamland Ballroom & Soc. Dance Club, Inc. v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 789 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…g drugs even though statute did not contain explicit scienter requirement). Nor is proof of specific intent always required as a matter of state law. See State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 564-65 (Fla.1999) (DUI manslaughter statute); Quinn v. State, 751 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that section 943.0435, punishing failure of sex offender to register, is not facially unconstitutional because it lacks mens rea requirement). In fact we have previously held that section 796.07 is not facially unco…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (U.S. 1971)
- United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (U.S. 1922)
- Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1957)