TERI LYNN DARBY A/K/A TERI LYNN VEIL A/K/A TERI LYNN NOVAK AND MICHELLE VEIL, APPELLANTS,
v.
ATLANTA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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Teri Lynn Darby and Michelle Veil appealed a trial court's denial of their motions to transfer venue from Hillsborough to Polk County in an insurance declaratory relief action. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the venue transfer because Polk County had substantially stronger connections to the case while Hillsborough County's only connection was that the defendant-insurer had an office there.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the venue transfer. Because Polk County was the site of the accident, the location where the insurance policy was issued, and where the underlying subrogation suit was filed, while Hillsborough County's only connection was that the defendant-insurer maintained an office there, the interest of justice supports transfer to Polk County under section 47.122.
[1] A trial court's decision on a change of venue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
[2] A plaintiff's venue selection is a meaningful consideration in assessing the convenience of the parties, but not the paramount one.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a plaintiffs venue selection is not the paramount consideration; but "it is a meaningful one in assessing the convenience of the parties."”
Establishes that while a plaintiff's venue choice matters, it is not the controlling factor in venue transfer analysis.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMichelle Veil was involved in an automobile accident in Polk County while driving a car owned by Teri and Robert Darby. State Farm Insurance Company, …
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BLUE, Judge.
Teri Lynn Darby and Michelle Veil appeal a nonfinal order denying their motions to transfer venue from Hillsborough to Polk County. We reverse.
Michelle Veil was involved in an accident in Polk County while driving a car that belonged to Teri and Robert Darby. Veil hit a person insured by State Farm Insurance Company. State Farm, as sub-rogee, sued Teri Darby, Robert Darby and Veil in Polk County. The Darbys had an automobile insurance policy with Atlanta Casualty Insurance Company; the policy was issued in Polk County. Atlanta Casualty filed a complaint for declaratory relief, alleging that Veil was an excluded driver under the policy and seeking a declaration as to whether it owes coverage. Atlanta Casualty filed its complaint in Hillsbor- ough County and named the following defendants: the Darbys, Veil, State Farm, and State Farm’s insured. The complaint alleged that venue is proper in Hillsbor-ough County because State Farm has agents who conduct business there. This is the only allegation that touches Hillsbor-ough County.
Teri Darby and Veil filed almost identical unsworn motions for change of venue to Polk County. They requested a change based on the convenience of the parties and the “administration” of justice. In support, they submitted an affidavit by a State Farm claim representative with knowledge of the subrogation claim. This affidavit stated that the accident occurred in Polk County; the subrogation lawsuit was filed in Polk County; the medical providers who treated State Farm’s insured were either in Polk County or Virginia; and the State Farm claims professionals who handled this claim worked in either Polk County or Virginia. The affidavit also stated that no State Farm claims representatives in Hillsborough County handled any aspect of this claim.
Section 47.122, Florida Statutes (19&7), allows a change of venue for the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice. A trial court’s decision on a change of venue will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See Tindall v. Smith, 601 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
When deciding a venue issue, a plaintiffs venue selection is not the paramount consideration; but “it is a meaningful one in assessing the convenience of the parties.” J.L.S. v. R.J.L., 708 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
Atlanta Casualty’s venue selection was based on the fact that State Farm has an office in Hillsborough; the affidavit by State Farm shows that the Hillsborough office has no connection to the lawsuit or the underlying claim. Polk County, on the other hand, was the site of the accident, the place where the Darbys’ policy was issued, and the location of the court that will hear the underlying subrogation claim. Based on these factors, the interest of justice supports a change of venue to Polk County under section 47.122. See E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Fuzzell, 681 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (granting change of venue to Lake County, which contained majority of witnesses and was site of all alleged conduct; noting that in the interest of justice, Polk County should not hear a case when only connection to Polk was location of lawyer’s office).
With nothing more to support venue in Hillsbor-ough County, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the change of venue.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
PATTERSON, C.J., and SALCINES, J., Concur.
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Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Elsenheimer, 952 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought.” A trial court’s decision on whether to change venue under section 47.122 is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Darby v. Atlanta Cas. Ins. Co., 752 So. 2d 102,103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Cedar Res., Inc., 761 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In Darby, this court recognized that “[w]hen deciding a venue issue, a plaintiffs venue selection is not the paramount consideration;…
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RJG Env't, Inc. v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…ies, the trial court faces more than one legally acceptable venue; its venue decision will stand absent an abuse of discretion. Id.; Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Elsenheimer, 952 So. 2d 575, 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Darby v. Atlanta Cas. Ins. Co., 752 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). RJG argues that it has a debtor-creditor relationship with State Farm, thus making Manatee County, the place where payment allegedly was due, the proper venue. But RJG seeks unliquidated damages; the amount of its recovery,…1 / 2
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Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Fla. Mun. Ins. Tr., 818 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…or witnesses. Eggers v. Eggers, 776 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)(citing Vero v. Vero, 659 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)). The plaintiffs choice of venue is significant in assessing the convenience of the parties. Darby v. Atlanta Gas. Ins. Co., 752 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Our standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Eggers, 776 So. 2d at 1097. As appellant points out, however, cases where an appellate court has found an abuse of discretion in faili…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- J.L.S. v. R.J.L. & State of Fla., 708 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Tindall v. Smith, 601 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- E.I. DuPONT DE Nemours & Co. v. Fuzzell, 681 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)