DONALD S. BALDWIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Baldwin's third appeal of his second-degree murder conviction is affirmed as to the firearm enhancement issue (waived by failure to raise in first appeal), but reversed as to the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to enter an amended sentence months after the appeal was filed.
A trial court loses jurisdiction to modify a sentence once an appeal is filed, and any amended sentence entered thereafter must be struck.
[1] A trial court loses jurisdiction to enter an amended sentence after a defendant has filed an appeal.
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDonald Baldwin was convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm and resentenced twice. The trial court attempted to enter an amended sentence addi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Firearm Enhancement cases and more on FLexlaw
PATTERSON, Chief Judge.
Donald Baldwin appeals for the third time his judgment and sentence for second-degree murder with a firearm. See Baldwin v. State, 700 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Baldwin v. State, 666 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). In this appeal following his second resentencing, Baldwin argues that the trial court erred in enhancing the charge from a first-degree felony to a life felony for the use of a firearm because the use of a firearm was an element of the offense. We affirm as to this issue because the error was waived by Baldwin’s failure to raise it in his first appeal. We find no merit in the remaining points in Baldwin’s initial brief.
In his supplemental brief, Baldwin argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter an amended sentence several months after the judgment and sentence on appeal was rendered. The amended sentence added a three-year minimum mandatory sentence for the use of a firearm. We agree that the trial court lost jurisdiction when Baldwin filed his appeal. See Skaggs v. State, 620 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Accordingly, we strike the amended sentence entered on October 9, 1998, and reinstate the sentence of May 14,1998.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part. BLUE and GREEN, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (17 total)
-
Lloyd's Underwriter's AT London v. Ruby, Inc., 801 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…ng a trial upon the merits.” Id. at 853 (quoting State Bank of Eau Gallie v. Raymond, 103 Fla. 649, 138 So. 40, 43 (Fla.1931)). An order denying a motion to vacate a default is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See George v. Radcliffe, 753 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). It is an order granting a motion to vacate which is reviewed under a gross abuse of discretion standard. Id. McKinzie By & Through McKinzie v. Hollywood, Inc., 421 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In Shurgard Storage C…1 / 2
-
Emmer v. Brucato, 813 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…, Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla.1962). It is, however, unclear to us the difference between “gross abuse of discretion” and "abuse of discretion,” although some courts have recognized, though not defined, a difference. See George v. Radcliffe, 753 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). ("[I]t makes sense to use abuse of discretion, not gross abuse, as the standard of review, when the trial court has denied a motion to vacate.") In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), the supreme court defined a…
-
Gibson Tr., Inc. v. Allen, 883 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…hearing without a hearing. An order denying a motion to vacate a default is reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard of review. See Lloyd’s Underwriter’s at London v. Ruby, Inc., 801 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); George v. Radcliffe, 753 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Florida courts have a liberal policy of vacating defaults so that cases can be decided on the merits. See N. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849, 853 (FIa.1962); Coquina Beach Club Condo. Ass’n v. Wagner, 813 So. 2…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Baldwin v. State, 700 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Skaggs v. State, 620 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Baldwin v. State, 666 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)