BARBARA ABRAHAM AND IRA POZEN, P.A., APPELLANTS,
v.
PAUL ABRAHAM, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court affirmed the denial of the wife's petition for modification but reversed the denial of her attorney's motion for statutory attorney's fees.
The former wife appealed an order domesticating a New York judgment of dissolution and denying her petition for modification. Her attorney also appeal…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Statutory Attorney'S Fees cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Barbara Abraham, the former wife, appeals from an order domesticating a judgment of dissolution of marriage from New York State,1 and denying her petition for modification. We affirm the denial of that petition, as we find no abuse of discretion.
However, as to her attorney’s appeal from the denial of his motion for statutory attorney’s fees, we reverse. The award of fees is a matter of determining one party’s need and the other party’s ability to pay. § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). “The prevailing party standard does not govern in determining whether the court may award an attorney fee to a party in a dissolution action.” Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri, Holton, & Douberley, P.A. v. Mullin, 602 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (citations omitted); see also Abernathy v. Fishkin, 638 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“Statutory fees awarded pursuant to section 61.16 are not based upon a prevailing-party standard”). Although the wife did not prevail in her action, the record does not demonstrate that she acted in bad faith, or that this litigation was “frivolous or spurious or was brought primarily to harass the adverse party.” Cervoni v. Cervoni 715 So. 2d 282, 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (citation omitted).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. The final judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered in New York in 1972, and modified in 1976.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Murray v. Murray, 826 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…ny award.2 Mrs. Murray further cross-appeals the lower court’s denial of her motion for statutory attorney’s fees and costs. “The award of fees is a matter of, determining one party’s needs and the other party’s ability to pay.” Abraham v. Abraham, 753 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). The purpose of section 61.16 is to ensure that, both parties will have a similar ability to obtain competent legal counsel. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla.1997). The record demonstrates th…
-
O'Hair v. O'Hair (Fla. 6th DCA 2024)…r the governing statute—section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes—is not dependent on who prevails but is determined by one party’s need and the other party’s ability to pay. Spector v. Spector, 226 So. 3d 256, 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Abraham v. Abraham, 753 So. 2d 625, 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). On this record, we cannot say that the record clearly precludes Former Husband from recovering any attorney fees. Therefore, regardless of the trial court’s ruling on the parties’ motions, the trial court shall consider Fo…
Authorities Cited
- Abernethy v. Fishkin, 638 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Cervoni v. Cervoni, 715 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Pyszka v. Mullin, 602 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)