SAMMIE O'NEAL GRIFFIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2000-03-13
No. 1D99-574
ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., CONCUR.
753 So. 2d 676 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Griffin, a 24-year-old, challenged a probation order with jail as a special condition for a sexual offense involving a 16-year-old, claiming the statute violated his constitutional rights to privacy, equal protection, and due process. The court rejected his constitutional arguments and affirmed the probation order, establishing that an Ashby plea preserving appellate review of a dispositive ruling is permissible even without explicit state stipulation when reversal would make prosecution legally impossible.


Holding

The court affirmed the probation order, concluding that the motion to dismiss was properly denied and that Griffin's constitutional arguments were unpersuasive. The court held that an Ashby plea is permissible without state stipulation when reversal of the favorable ruling would make it legally impossible for the state to proceed with prosecution, distinguishing cases where reversal would merely be tactically infeasible.


Headnotes

[1] An appellate court has jurisdiction to consider the propriety of an order denying a motion to dismiss when the defendant pleads to a criminal charge while reserving the r…

[2] A defendant may enter a nolo contendere plea reserving the right to appeal a ruling only when the legal issue to be determined on appeal is dispositive of the case.

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Key Quotes

“Pleading to a criminal charge while reserving the right to seek appellate review of a crucial ruling avoids an unnecessary trial.”

Establishes the purpose and permissibility of Ashby pleas to avoid unnecessary trials while preserving appellate review.

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Facts & Procedural History

Griffin, age 24, was charged with violating section 794.05(1), Florida Statutes, for a sexual encounter with a 16-year-old girl. He moved to dismiss t…

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Opinion of the Court
BENTON, J.

BENTON, J.

On this direct appeal of an order placing the appellant on probation with six months in jail as a special condition, we first address the state’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to consider the propriety of an antecedent order denying a motion to dismiss. We conclude we do have jurisdiction, that the motion to dismiss was properly denied, and that the probation order should be affirmed.

Sammie O’Neal Griffin moved to dismiss the information charging him with a violation of section 794.05(1), Florida Statutes (1997). Twenty-four years old at the time, he was alleged to have had a sexual encounter with a sixteen-year-old girl. He argued for dismissal on grounds the statute unconstitutionally interferes with privacy rights, violates equal protection guarantees, and offends due process.

After the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, he entered into a plea agreement which reflected his intention to appeal the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The trial court noted that Mr. Griffin was reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, but it did not explicitly rule that the motion was dispositive. The state did not stipulate that the denial of the motion to dismiss was dispositive of the case. The state now contends that consideration of the issue is foreclosed. We reject the state’s contention.

Pleading to a criminal charge while reserving the right to seek appellate review of a crucial ruling avoids an unnecessary trial. State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1971). If the ruling is affirmed, the conviction — or, as here, the probation order — is also affirmed. But an “Ashby nolo plea is permissible only when the legal issue to be determined on appeal is dispos-itive of the case.” Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla.1979). A ruling is “dis-positive” in this context if, at the time of the plea, it is clear that the state cannot or will not proceed with prosecution of the case on remand in the event the ruling is reversed.

When the parties stipulate in the trial court that an issue is determinative in this sense, the state is foreclosed from arguing otherwise on appeal. Phuagnong v. State, 714 So. 2d 527, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). In the present case, however, no stipulation was necessary because reversal of the favorable ruling the state received below would make it legally impossible for the state to proceed with the prosecution. This is not a case where reversal of a favorable ruling would make it merely tactically infeasible for the state to go forward.

On the merits, we find unpersuasive appellant’s arguments that his behavior enjoyed constitutional protection or that applying the statute in this situation violates his constitutional rights. We therefore affirm the probation order on the authority of Wright v. State, 739 So. 2d 1230, 1232-33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). See also State v. Walborn, 729 So. 2d 504, 505-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), review denied, 740 So. 2d 529 (Fla.1999); Carlson v. State, 723 So. 2d 338, 338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); State v. Cunningham, 712 So. 2d 1221, 1221-25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Cf. J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla.1998); Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.1994).

Affirmed.

ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., CONCUR.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Carroll v. State, 761 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    …that the motion was dispos-itive. Although it is true that the court did not enter such a finding, we believe that the mere nature of a motion to dismiss makes the trial court’s ruling on it dispositive for purposes of appeal. See Griffin v. State, 753 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). As a result, this court has jurisdiction to review the substance of the appeal. Turning to the merits, appellant argues that he could not properly be convicted of driving with a suspended or revoked license because he had never…
  • Kendrick Robinson v. State, 885 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
    …. State, 376 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla.1979). “A ruling is ‘dispositive’ ... if, at the time of the plea, it is clear that the state cannot or will not proceed with prosecution of the case on remand in the event the ruling is reversed.” Griffin v. State, 753 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). “When the parties stipulate in the trial court that an issue is determinative in this sense, the state is foreclosed from arguing otherwise on appeal.” Id. See also Phuagnong v. State, 714 So. 2d 527, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998…
  • Blow v. State, 993 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …trial court. Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i). A ruling is dispositive if it is clear that the State cannot proceed with prosecution on remand if the ruling is reversed. Hedglin v. State, 892 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Griffin v. State, 753 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Here, even if this court were to reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, the State could proceed with prosecuting Blow for child abuse under section 827.03(l)(b). We note that at the change of plea heari…

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