E.C.H., A CHILD, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By (13 total)

• Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2002)
  …n or excuse.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 227 (1992). This definition is in conflict with the definition of the malice element for aggravated child abuse set out by this Court in State v. Gaylord, 356 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla.1978). In Young v. State, 753 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), the First District Court of Appeal explained this conflict by stating: In State v. Gaylord, 356 So. 2d 313 (Fla.1978), the court held that section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), which treated “maliciously punish[ing] a chi…
• Martinez v. State, 981 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2008)
  …1982)); see also Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 369 (Fla.2002)) (holding that fundamental error occurred where the erroneous instruction “reduce[ed] the state’s burden of proof on an essential element of the offense charged” (quoting Young v. State, 753 So. 2d 725, 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (brackets omitted)). Where the challenged jury instruction involves an affirmative defense, as opposed to an element of the crime, fundamental error only occurs where a jury instruction is “so flawed as to deprive defendants…
• Reed v. State, 783 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
  …and (2) by giving an erroneous standard jury instruction defining an essential element of the crime in a manner directly contrary to the requirements set forth in State v. Gaylord, 356 So. 2d 313 (Fla.1978), as recently construed in Young v. State, 753 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s refusal to require the victim to reveal her physical wounds at the trial. As to the second issue, we affirm based upon appellant’s failure to preserve the issue for appellate r…

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Authorities Cited

• Proko v. State, 566 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
• Marsh v. State, 724 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)