PEDRO LLUIS, APPELLANT,
v.
ANGELA LLUIS, APPELLEE
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Pedro Lluis appealed a decree denying his divorce petition and awarding alimony and attorney's fees to his wife Angela. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the chancellor's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and were supported by competent evidence in the voluminous record.
The chancellor's factual conclusions were not clearly erroneous and were supported by competent evidence in the record. Therefore, the decree denying the divorce and awarding alimony and attorney's fees was properly entered and must be affirmed.
“his conclusions solely on the facts will not be reversed unless it clearly appears that he has erred in such conclusions”
Establishes the standard of review for factual findings by a chancellor in divorce cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePedro Lluis filed a bill for divorce against Angela Lluis on statutory grounds. The testimony covered approximately 260 pages of the record and was ta…
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•Brown, C. J.-
— This is an appeal from a decree denying the divorce prayed for in appellant’s bill, and decreeing alimony of $7.00 per week until further order of the court, to be paid to the defendant in the bill, together with a solicitor’s fee of $100.00, which was in addition to a like sum which had been allowed by previous order of the court as a temporary solicitor’s fee, and taxing the costs of the cause against the complainant.
This is a bill for divorce upon one of the statutory grounds and the testimony in the case was quite voluminous, covering some 260 pages of the record. The controlling question in the cause, and the one to which substantially all of the argument has been addressed, is whether or not the chancellor, in denying the relief prayed for in the bill, has so clearly erred in his conclusions on the facts as to call for a reversal by this court.
The testimony was taken before a general master of the court below. In such eases, the finding of the chancellor on the testimony will not be given the same effect as the verdict of a jury, but his conclusions solely on the facts will not be reversed unless it clearly appears that he has erred in such conclusions. It is also a general rule that where there is irreconcilable conflict in the testimony on which a decree is based, but there is evidence to support the decree, it will not be reversed. Whether the decree of the chancellor is based upon testimony taken before him, or before a master or examiner appointed by him, in either event, his conclusion on the facts will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears to be erroneous. After a careful reading and consideration of the entire record, including the testimony and the briefs and argument of counsel, and bearing in mind that the burden of proof rested upon the complainant, appellant here, we are not able to say that it clearly appears that the chancellor has erred in his conclusions on the facts, and that his decree is, therefore, erroneous. While there was irreconcilable conflict in the testimony on the material issues of fact, there undoubtedly appears evidence to support the decree. As this court would not be authorized to reverse the conclusions of the chancellor on the vital issues in the ease, upon which his denial of the complainant’s prayer for divorce was based, no error can be predicated upon the further action of the chancellor in awarding alimony and attorneys’ fees as above pointed out, and which were duly prayed for in the defendant’s answer. The decree of the court below is, therefore, affirmed.
Ellis and Strum, J. J., concur. Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion.
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Weaver-Loughridge Lumber Co. v. J. Ham Kirkland et ux., 99 Fla. 426 (Fla. 1927)…nk, 80 Fla. 685, 87 So. R. 315; Hill v. Beacham, 79 Fla. 430, 85 So. R. 147. Greenblatt v. Bissell Dry Goods Co., 85 Fla. 82, 95 So. R. 302; Edney v. Stinson, 90 Fla. 335, 105 So. R. 821; Birgess v. Wirt, 91 Fla. 425, 108 So. R. 169; Lluis v. Lluis, 91 Fla. 706, 108 So. R. 671. Affirmed. Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J. concur.…
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Goldfarb Novelty Co. OF Fla., Inc. v. Vann, 94 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1957)…whether or not he was promised 25% of the net profits for the period. All the factual matters seem to have been decided by the chancellor in appellee’s favor and we have not become convinced that his findings were clearly erroneous. Lluis v. Lluis, 91 Fla. 706, 108 So. 671; First Atlantic National Bank of Daytona Beach, Fla. v. Cobbett, Fla., 82 So. 2d 870. Of course, once he decided that appellee was in the right, the determination of the amount of the salary was simple, $100 for each week that he had no…
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White Furniture Co. v. Mather, 154 Fla. 129 (Fla. 1943)…dings on such testimony will not be given the same effect as the verdict of a jury, the conclusions of the chan [*131] cellor on testimony so taken may not he reversed, unless it clearly appears that he has erred in such conclusions. Lluis v. Lluis, 91 Fla. 706, 108 So. 671; Weaver-Loughridge Lumber Co. v. Kirkland, et ux., 99 Fla. 426, 131 So. 784. There is ample evidence to sustain the decree. This court is unable to say that the appellant has sustained the burden of proof cast upon him by the pleadings…