IVAN TRUJILLO, PETITIONER,
v.
UNIROYAL TIRE COMPANY, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

Fla. | 2000-02-24
No. SC93527
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur., PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only., LEWIS, J., recused.
753 So. 2d 1256 Florida Supreme Court (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court reversed the Third District Court of Appeal's decision that had reversed a trial court's order for a new trial based on an incorrect legal standard. The Court clarified that trial judges have broad discretion to grant new trials when verdicts are contrary to the manifest weight of evidence, even when it is not clear, obvious, and indisputable that the jury was wrong.


Holding

A trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial when a verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and this discretion exists even when it is not clear, obvious, and indisputable that the jury was wrong. The District Court of Appeal applied an overly restrictive standard that was inconsistent with established precedent.


Headnotes

[1] A trial judge has broad discretion to grant a new trial when a verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by granting a new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence standard only when it is clear, obvious, and indisputable that th…

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Key Quotes

“The trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.... The trial judge's discretion permits the grant of a new trial although it is not "clear, obvious, and indisputable that the jury was wrong."”

Establishes the controlling standard for trial court discretion in new trial motions based on manifest weight of evidence, directly contradicting the District Court's stricter interpretation.

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Facts & Procedural History

Vivian Trujillo was injured in a vehicle accident caused by a tire blowout resulting from improper repair (plugging instead of internal patching). Tru…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Uniroyal Tire Co. v. Trujillo, 711 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1998), which expressly and directly conflicts with Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1999). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash Uniroyal.

Vivian Trujillo was injured when her Surburban vehicle was involved in an accident resulting from a blowout. The blowout was caused by an improperly repaired tire; a serviceman had “plugged” the tire rather than installing an interior patch. Trujillo sued the tire’s manufacturer, Uniroyal, claiming strict liability because Uniroyal had failed to warn consumers that its tires must be repaired with an internal patch, not a plug. The jury returned a verdict finding Uniroyal liable for failing to warn consumers but finding that Trujillo was 100 percent comparatively negligent for fading to use her seatbelt.

The trial court concluded that the verdict was inappropriate for various reasons and ordered an additur of $26,981 or, if Uniroyal objected to the additur, a new trial. Uniroyal objected to the additur, and the court ordered a new trial. Uniroyal appealed the order granting a new trial and the district court reversed, applying the following rule of law:

The trial court further found that “the damages awarded were inadequate given all the circumstances and against the manifest weight of the evidence.” The law is clear that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when it is clear, obvious, and indisputable that the jury was wrong. In applying this standard, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial.

Uniroyal, 711 So. 2d at 608-09 (citations omitted and emphasis added). Trujillo contends that the district court applied the wrong rule of law. We agree.

We recently addressed this issue in Estate of Stuckey, wherein we explained:

To summarize, this Court has repeatedly held that the trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a. new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.... The trial judge’s discretion permits the grant of a new trial although it is not “clear, obvious, and indisputable that the jury was wrong.”

Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490 (emphasis added).1

We quash Uniroyal and remand for proceedings consistent with Estate of Stuckey.

It is so ordered.

HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only.

LEWIS, J., recused.

. This Court in Estate of Stuckey also set forth the appropriate standards of review for remit-titur and additur. See Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d at 498.


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Cited By

  • Beauvais v. Edell, 760 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …der Stuckey, trial, court decisions on remittiturs and ad-diturs and whether to grant new trials on weight of the evidence grounds are all governed by the reasonableness test for abuse of discretion on appeal. See also Trujillo v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 753 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2000) (error to reverse order granting additur and new trial even though jury verdict not clearly, obviously and indisputably wrong). Reviewing the record in this case, I cannot say that no reasonable judge would have denied the motion for a…
  • Schmidt v. VAN, 65 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …discretion. If an appellate court determines that reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. Id. at 497-98; see also Trujillo v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 753 So. 2d 1256 (Fla.2000). However, a reviewing court may find that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the manifest [*1108] weight of the evidence was contrary to the verdict and granting a new trial in two circumstances: (1) where the evid…
  • Moore v. Perry, 944 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    …ourt must employ the reasonableness test in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Beauvais v. Edell, 760 So. 2d 262, 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), review denied, 780 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2001); see also Trujillo v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 753 So. 2d 1256 (Fla.2000). In the present case the medical testimony was in sharp conflict as to the effect, if any, of the accident on Ms. Perry. Dr. Smith, for example, who testified on behalf of Ms. Perry, opined that the accident may have caused a herniated d…

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