CHARLES ARNOLD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Charles Arnold appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging a discrepancy between the written judgment (reflecting a 20-year habitual felony offender sentence) and the oral pronouncement (which he claims did not impose a habitual offender sentence). The court reverses and remands, holding that the trial court's findings do not conclusively refute Arnold's claim and that oral pronouncement controls when it conflicts with written orders.
The court held that determining a defendant qualifies as a habitual felony offender is a separate ministerial step from the court's discretionary decision to actually impose a habitual offender sentence. The trial court's finding that Arnold qualified as a habitual offender does not conclusively refute his claim that the written sentence does not conform to the oral pronouncement, and where a written order conflicts with the trial court's oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls.
[1] A written sentencing order must conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence; the oral pronouncement controls when there is a discrepancy.
[2] A trial court's determination that a defendant qualifies as a habitual felony offender does not mandate that the court must impose a habitual offender sentence.
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Establishes the legal framework that determining qualification and imposing sentencing are separate steps, meaning the trial court's finding that Arnold qualified as a habitual offender does not necessarily mean he received such a sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArnold filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), claiming the written judgment and sentence imp…
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PER CURIAM.
Charles Arnold appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Arnold alleges that the written judgment and sentence entered in his case does not comport with the oral pronouncement in that the written sentencing document reflects a twenty year habitual felony offender prison sentence while the oral pronouncement did not provide for a habitual offender sentence.
The trial court denied this claim, finding that it was refuted by the record. In support of its conclusion, the trial court attached only one page of the sentencing transcript which reflected that the trial court found that Arnold qualified as a habitual felony offender. This does not, however, refute Arnold’s claim that he was not orally sentenced as a habitual felony offender. Sentencing under the habitual felony offender statute involves a two-step process. See King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136, 1138 (Fla.1996). First, the court has the ministerial duty of determining whether the defendant qualifies as a habitual felony offender. See id. at 1139. Second, the court must decide whether the defendant will be sentenced as a habitual felony offender. See id. Thus, even where the court determines that the defendant is a habitual offender, the court may still decide not to impose a habitual offender sentence. See id.
Therefore, the fact that the trial court determined that Arnold was a habitual felony offender does not necessarily mean that the trial court sentenced him to a habitual offender sentence.1 It is well-established that where a written order does not conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls. See Driver v. State, 710 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Because the record attachments provided by the trial court do not conclusively refute Arnold’s claim that the written sentence does not conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and CASANUEVA, and STRINGER, JJ., Concur. . Documents attached by Arnold support his contention that the trial court did not orally pronounce a habitual offender sentence. We decline, however, to make this determination based on the incomplete record before this court.
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O'Neal v. State, 862 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ve applied this rationale to reverse habitual offender sentences where the trial court found that a defendant qualified as a habitual offender but did not announce that it was going to impose a habitual offender sentence. See, e.g., Arnold v. State, 754 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). That rationale, however, is no longer viable because of changes in the habitual felony offender statute. In support of his argument, O’Neal relies on cases which involve offenses committed before 1995. The version of section 775…
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Yates v. State, 823 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…r sentencing. The court then imposed .the thirty-year sentence, which far exceeded the guidelines maximum range. In so doing, it clearly made the determination that Yates should and was to receive an habitual offender sentence. In Arnold, v. State, 754 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the defendant was. sentenced as an habitual felony offender, pursuant to the written sentence. The transcript of the sentencing hearing showed Arnold was found to have qualified for habitual offender sentencing, but there was no…1 / 2
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Brown v. State, 786 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…; however, the written sentencing order fails to reflect the nunc pro tunc language. It is well established that, where a written order does not conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls. See Arnold, v. State, 754 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Accord Lesesne v. State, 706 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Since the record demonstrates that the trial court pronounced at the re-sentencing hearing that the defendant’s sentence was to run nunc pro tunc to the date the o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996)
- Driver v. State, 710 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)