MICHAEL EDWIN MARCINIAK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court's order dismissing Marciniak's motion to correct an illegal sentence. The court held that while the trial court properly dismissed Marciniak's claim about prior conviction points, it erred by denying his claim that his 34-month sentence exceeded the statutory maximum imposed by section 921.001(5), Florida Statutes.
The court held that Marciniak's 34-month sentence was illegal because it exceeded the 22-month maximum authorized by section 921.001(5). The court further held that Rule 3.800(a) permits correction of sentences that patently violate statutory limitations, distinguishing such illegal sentences from mere sentencing guideline application errors.
[1] A motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) may be used to correct an illegal sentence, which includes a sentence that patently fails to comport with…
[2] A sentence exceeding the statutory maximum authorized by law is considered an illegal sentence that may be corrected under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1997, who has at least one prior felony conviction and whose minimum recommended sentence is less than 22 months in state prison may be sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed 22 months.”
The statutory provision establishing the 22-month maximum sentence that governed Marciniak's case.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarciniak was sentenced to 34 months in state prison for a felony committed after July 1, 1997. His sentencing scoresheet reflected a recommended sent…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
The trial court’s order dismissing/denying appellant’s motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Appellant’s first claim is that he was improperly assessed points for prior convictions for which adjudication was withheld. The trial court dismissed the motion without prejudice to raise the claim in a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. That part of the order is affirmed.
Appellant also claims that his sentence is illegal for failure to comport with section 921.001(5) 1 Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent part:
A person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1997, who has at least one prior felony conviction and whose minimum recommended sentence is less than 22 months in state prison may be sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed 22 months.
Appellant’s scoresheet reflects a recommended sentence range of 20.7 to 34.6 months state prison.2 Thus, appellant’s minimum recommended sentence would be 20.7 months state prison incarceration, and the sentencing limitation in section 921.001(5) would apply. Therefore, appellant’s 34-month state prison sentence is illegal. The order denying his 3.800(a) motion is reversed and the cause remanded for resentencing.
We recognize that with the exception of calculation errors in a sentencing guideline scoresheet, rule 3.800(a) may not be used to correct sentencing guideline errors. See Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1995). The error in the present case, however, is not merely an error in applying the guidelines. To the contrary, the effect of the trial court’s error was to impose a sentence greater than the maximum sentence authorized by law. Thus, the sentence qualifies as an “illegal sentence” within the meaning of rule 3.800(a). As the Supreme Court explained in State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998), “[a] sentence that patently fails to comport with statutory or constitutional limitations is by definition “illegal”. ” Because the sentence imposed in this case is illegal, it may be corrected pursuant to a rule 3.800(a) motion.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BARFIELD, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ„ CONCUR. . Appellant's motion refers to the guidelines analog to this statute, Rule 3.703(d)(27), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
. The Florida Supreme Court has held that the range arrived at by increasing or decreasing the median recommended sentence under the sentencing guidelines is the "recom mended range.” See Mays v. State, 111 So. 2d 515, 515 (Fla.1998).
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Jones v. State, 764 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…s scoresheet was 15.15 months, which is less than 22 months. Under section 921.001(5), Florida Statutes (1997), the maximum sentence appellant could have received for the crime of resisting arrest with violence was 22 months. See Marciniak v. State, 754 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Appellant’s conviction and sentence for resisting an officer without violence are reversed. Appellant’s sentence for resisting an officer with violence is quashed. The case is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing, in…
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Morgan v. State, 840 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…o exceed five years — not ten. The proper method for correcting an illegal sentence is by filing a motion pursu [*1153] ant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). See Crotts v. State, 795 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Marciniak v. State, 754 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); DeSantis v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). On remand, the trial court may exercise its discretion to treat this motion, filed pursuant to rule 3.850, as one filed pursuant to rule 3.800 and grant appropriate relief.…
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Jackson v. State, 817 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…d sentence was 18.3 months); Jones v. State, 764 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (maximum sentence defendant could receive was 22 months where he had one prior felony conviction and a minimum recommended sentence of 15.15 months); Marciniak v. State, 754 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (defendant’s 34 month sentence was illegal where sentencing limitation in section 921.001(5) applied). It appears this section is designed to grant the trial court discretion to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the range s…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1998)
- Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1995)