ADAM EASLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1999-08-04
No. 98-3624
STONE and KLEIN, JJ„ concur.
755 So. 2d 692 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1999)

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Synopsis

Adam Easley was convicted of cocaine possession with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a church in violation of Florida Statutes section 893.13(1)(e)1. On appeal, Easley challenged the statute as void for vagueness and violative of the Establishment Clause. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting both constitutional challenges.


Holding

The statute is neither void for vagueness nor violative of the Establishment Clause. The statute survives scrutiny under the three-part Lemon test because it has a secular legislative purpose (deterring drug sales near places where families and young people gather), its primary effect does not advance or inhibit religion, and it does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.


Headnotes

[1] A statute is not void for vagueness if it is sufficiently clear to inform persons of ordinary intelligence what conduct is prohibited.

[2] A statute does not violate the Establishment Clause if it has a secular legislative purpose, its principal effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not…

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Key Quotes

“it would be inappropriate to impute an unconstitutional purpose, i.e., the advancement of religion, when a secular purpose is equally, if not more likely, i.e., deterring drug sales near places where the public, especially families and young people, have a tendency to gather”

The court's rationale for finding a secular legislative purpose under the Lemon test, rejecting the Establishment Clause challenge

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Facts & Procedural History

Easley was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a church or religious organization under Florida law. The statu…

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Opinion of the Court
STEVENSON, J.

STEVENSON, J.

Appellant, Adam Easley, was convicted of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a church or religious organization in violation of section 893.13(l)(e)l, Florida Statutes (1997). On appeal, Easley contends that the statute under which he was convicted is void for vagueness and violates the Establishment Clause. We disagree and affirm.

As for Easley’s void for vagueness challenge, we affirm on the authority of this court’s recent opinion in Jean v. State, 24 Fla.

L. Weekly D1392, — So. 2d -, 1999 WL 393477 (Fla. 4th DCA June 16, 1999). We similarly reject Easley’s contention that the statute violates the Establishment Clause as we find that it passes muster under the three-part test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).1 We have examined the legislative history, and it does not contain any statements regarding the legislature’s purpose in increasing the penalties for drug sales near churches and other places of worship.

We note, however, that churches and places of worship have not been singled out; rather, the legislature has determined that increased penalties should apply to drug sales committed in close proximity to child care facilities, schools, colleges, public parks, and convenience stores. See §§ 893.13(1)(d) & (e), Fla. Stat. Given the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes, it would be inappropriate to impute an unconstitutional purpose, i.e., the advancement of religion, when a secular purpose is equally, if not more likely, i.e., deterring drug sales near places where the public, especially families and young people, have a tendency to gather. Cf. Todd v. State, 643 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding that Florida Statutes section 806.13, proscribing damage to the property of others and increasing the degree of the offense if the damage was to “any church, synagogue, mosque, or other place of worship,” did not violate the Establishment Clause), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1143, 115 S.Ct. 2579, 132 L.Ed.2d 829 (1995).

AFFIRMED.

STONE and KLEIN, JJ„ concur. . First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1971) (citations omitted).


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