MARY E. DUGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
J. E. POWELL AND CARRIE C. POWELL, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court denied a rehearing in a case where a married woman attempted to void a land sale contract. The court found that even if the contract lacked a proper seal as required by statute for married women, she could not retain a substantial partial payment while refusing to fulfill the contract.
No, a married woman cannot retain a substantial partial payment and refuse to comply with her contract, even if there are technical defects in the contract's execution regarding statutory sealing requirements.
“Under these circumstances, even if Sections 3801-3 and 3953, R. G. S. require a married woman’s contract to sell land to have a seal opposite her signature to the contract and the recitation in the contract that it is under seal is not a sufficient compliance with the statute, the married woman will not be permitted to retain the substantial partial payment made and refuse to comply with her contract, therefore the bill alleges an equity for appropriate relief.”
This quote establishes the court's reasoning for denying the married woman's attempt to void the contract.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA married woman signed a contract to sell land on August 21, 1925, without a seal opposite her signature, though the contract stated it was under seal…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Equitable Relief cases and more on FLexlaw
On Rehearing.
Per Curiam.
— In this case the married woman signed a contract dated August 21, 1925, without a seal opposite her signature, but the contract contained a clause “In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals.” One thousand dollars was accepted on the purchase price and time was not made of the essence of the contract. The contract may fairly have been interpreted as a practical matter to' mean that the purchaser would have thirty days from the date of the contract or fifteen days after delivery of abstract for purchaser’s attorney to examine and approve the abstract of title, before the second payment was required to be made, even if time be essential.
It is alleged that the abstract was delivered September 8, 1925, and the second payment was offered within two or three days after thirty days from the date of the contract, and two or three days after fifteen days from the delivery of the abstract.
Under these circumstances, even if Sections 3801-3 and 3953, R. G. S. require a married woman’s contract to sell land to have a seal opposite her signature to the contract and the recitation in the contract that it is under seal is not a sufficient compliance with the statute, the married woman will not be permitted to retain the substantial partial payment made and refuse to comply with her contract, therefore the bill alleges an equity for appropriate relief.
Rehearing denied.
All concur.