WILLIE ARTHUR JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Willie Jones appeals his conviction for manslaughter and robbery, challenging the admissibility of incriminating statements he made to his fiancée while in jail, claiming they were obtained through gross deception by law enforcement. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the use of a cooperating witness wearing a wire did not constitute a due process violation and did not implicate Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel protections.
The court held that the use of the cooperating witness wearing a wire did not constitute a due process violation based on gross deception, and that Jones' Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not implicated because he had not yet been arrested or charged with the crimes at issue when the statements were made.
[1] Incriminating statements made by a defendant to a third party wearing a wire at law enforcement's behest are not rendered inadmissible by gross deception when the third p…
[2] The use of a third party wearing a wire to elicit incriminating statements from a defendant does not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment due process rights when the t…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Mr. Jones' fiancee, wearing a wire at law enforcement's behest, simply encouraged Mr. Jones to tell her the truth and informed him that she would be talking to the police and would not lie to them. In our view, use of this ploy does not constitute a due process violation based on gross deception.”
Establishes the factual distinction from Walls and the court's holding that this conduct did not violate due process rights
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones was in jail on unrelated charges when his fiancée visited him wearing a wire at law enforcement's direction. During their conversation, she enco…
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ANTOON, C.J.
Willie Jones appeals the judgment and sentence imposed after the jury found him guilty of manslaughter and robbery.1 Only Mr. Jones’ argument challenging the admissibility of statements he made to a third party merits discussion; none of his arguments warrant reversal. Accordingly, we affirm.
Mr. Jones asserts that the incriminating statements he made to his fiancee while she was visiting him in jail should have been suppressed because they were obtained as a result of gross deception on the part of law enforcement. See Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131 (Fla.1991). In Walls, our supreme court held the defendant’s statements were impermissibly elicited by gross deception constituting a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process rights where a state agent fraudulently informed the defendant that he was speaking to her in confidence and insisted that he not tell his attorney of their conversation. In contrast, in the instant case Mr. Jones’ fiancee, wearing a wire at law enforcement’s behest, simply encouraged Mr. Jones to tell her the truth and informed him that she would be talking to the police and would not lie to them. In our view, use of this ploy does not constitute a due process violation based on gross deception.
Further, we note that Mr. Jones’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated as a result of the tactic employed by law enforcement. This is because at the time Mr. Jones made incriminating statements to his fiancee, he was in jail on unrelated charges and had not yet been arrested or charged with the crimes involved in the instant case. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990)(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not implicated when the suspect made incriminating statements to an undercover agent posing as the suspect’s cellmate because charges had not yet been filed against the suspect on the subject of the conversations).
Under these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Jones’ suppression motion.
AFFIRMED.
W. SHARP, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . §§ 782.07, 812.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999).
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State v. Russell, 814 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…e case until V.H. urged them to reopen her case. Being held and formally charged with one crime does not bar questioning about other uncharged crimes. McNeil; Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990); Jones v. State, 756 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Nor do we find a basis to conclude that Russell’s fifth amendment right to counsel was violated here. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the United States Supreme Court ruled that o…1 / 2
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London v. State, 240 So. 3d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)
Authorities Cited
- Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (U.S. 1990)
- Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1991)