MARY SILVERS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
U-HAUL COMPANY OF GEORGIA, ETC., APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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Mary Silvers appealed a judgment in favor of U-Haul after a bicycle-truck collision, arguing the trial court erred in excluding her expert's deposition testimony that would have rebutted the defendant's eyewitness evidence about distances and angles. The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the hypothetical question posed to the expert was poorly constructed and omitted material facts.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony because the hypothetical question posed to Mr. Stephens was poorly constructed, contained only partial relevant facts, and omitted material facts concerning the evasive actions taken by Mrs. Conners and the U-Haul truck.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit deposition testimony in rebuttal when the hypothetical question posed to the deponent omits material fact…
[2] A hypothetical question posed to an expert witness must contain all material facts relevant to the issue for the expert's opinion to be admissible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“limiting rebuttal which goes to the heart of the principal defense and which is not cumulative of evidence presented in plaintiffs case in chief is an abuse of discretion”
Establishes the legal standard for when exclusion of rebuttal evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion under Young-Chin v. City of Homestead
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMs. Silvers was riding her bicycle on the shoulder of a bridge when she was injured by a trailer towed by a U-Haul truck. Silvers testified she never …
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ANTOON, C.J.
In this personal injury action, Mary Silvers appeals the final judgment in favor of defendant, U-Haul Company of Georgia. Ms. Silvers argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow her to introduce the deposition testimony of U-Haul’s accident reconstructionist, Mr. Stephens, in rebuttal to the testimony of U-Haul’s witnesses. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion.1
Ms. Silvers was riding her bicycle along the shoulder of a bridge and was injured when she came into contact with a trailer being towed by a U-Haul truck. Ms. Silvers testified that she never crossed into the driving lane. However, the U-Haul driver testified that Ms. Silvers fell into the driving lane, causing him to swerve into the left lane to miss her. The motorist in the left lane, Mrs. Conners, testified that she was forced to take similar evasive action after realizing that Ms. Silvers was losing her balance and was falling into the right lane of traffic. Mrs. Conners was asked to give distance and angle estimates, which she-did after several times expressing her difficulty in judging distances.
Relying on Young-Chin v. City of Homestead, 597 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), Ms. Silvers argues that the expert testimony of Mr. Stephens was admissible to refute the distance and angle testimony of Mrs. Conners, thus rebutting U-Haul’s theory of defense. Young-Chin held that although a trial court has broad discretion in deciding the admissibility of evidence, “limiting rebuttal which goes to the heart of the principal defense and which is not cumulative of evidence presented in plaintiffs case in chief is an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 883 (citing Heberling v. Fleisher, 563 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dismissed, 570 So. 2d 1305 (Fla.1990)). For the reasons set forth below, we disagree with Ms. Silvers’ contention.
The trial court’s refusal to admit the proffered deposition into evidence was not an abuse of discretion given the circumstances. The hypothetical question prefacing Mr. Stephens’ answer contained only a portion of the relevant facts and did not contain relevant facts concerning the evasive action taken by Mrs. Conners and the U-Haul truck. It therefore was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to disallow the testimony. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brash, 73 Fla. 478, 74 So. 503 (1917). Further, the hypothetical was so poorly phrased and void of material fact that it left to speculation what assumptions were made by Mr. Stephens in reaching his conclusion that Mrs. Conners’ distance and angle testimony was not reliable. See Sheehan v. Frith, 138 So. 2d 76, 78-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
W. SHARP, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . This conclusion moots U-Haul’s argument on cross-appeal.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Young-Chin v. City OF Homestead, 597 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Standard OIL Co. v. Carros, 138 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)
- Heberling v. Joel Fleisher, M.D., 563 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brash, 73 Fla. 478 (Fla. 1917)