JAMES EDWARD BOYD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to revoke the appellant's probation. The court found that the appellant's repeated unexcused absences from a required drug treatment program constituted a material violation of his probation terms.
Yes, the appellant's repeated unexcused absences from his treatment program and failure to seek alternative treatment constituted a material violation of his probation, justifying its revocation.
[1] A probationer's unexcused absences from a treatment program can constitute a material violation of probation.
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in revoking probation when the evidence shows a probationer failed to attend half of required monthly counseling sessions and…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“concluding that a judge may find that two unexcused absences from a treatment program may indeed amount to a material violation of probation”
Establishes the legal principle that unexcused absences can be a material violation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant's probation required him to continue in a drug treatment program. He missed outpatient appointments in April and June 1998, and failed t…
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KAHN, J.
We affirm the trial court’s order revoking appellant’s probation. See Rawlins v. State, 711 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (concluding that a judge may find that two unexcused absences from a treatment program may indeed amount to a material violation of probation). The cases primarily relied upon by appellant, Bingham v. State, 655 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), and Washington v. State, 667 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), do not support reversal. In those cases, this court could find no evidence that the respective probationers had willfully and substantially violated the terms of their probation. The present case is different.
The terms of appellant’s probation required that he continue the drug treatment program he was currently enrolled in. The affidavit of violation alleged that appellant violated this condition. The affidavit of violation, and the evidence presented at the hearing, established that appellant missed his outpatient appointments in April 1998 and June 1998, some two and four months, respectively, after entry of his probation. The probation officer further testified that appellant failed to report for residential treatment in May 1998, although appellant apparently felt he was in need of such treatment. Testimony further established that appellant made no effort to reschedule his missed appointments until after the affidavit of violation had been filed. The treatment sessions required by the February probation order were to occur but once a month. Appellant neglected to attend half the sessions in the first four months. On these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked appellant’s probation.
The trial court could have properly concluded that appellant’s failure to attend half his counseling sessions, and his further failure to participate in a reasonable alternative, i.e., residential treatment, was a material violation and showed that appellant would not be successful as a probationer. AFFIRMED.
WOLF and LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Lawson v. State, 941 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…Mills v. State, 840 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Marcano v. State, 814 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“Generally, un-ex-cused absences from required therapeutic programs constitute willful violations of probation.”) (citing Boyd v. State, 756 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Santiago v. State, 722 So. 2d 950, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). We begin our analysis by noting that pursuant to the plea agreement, Lawson specifically agreed to submit to the requirements of drug offender probation. The co…
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Marcano v. State, 814 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…there is no evidence supporting that decision. See Cunningham v. State, 795 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Generally, un-excused absences from required therapeutic programs constitute willful violations of probation. See, e.g., Boyd v. State, 756 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Santiago [*1177] v. State, 722 So. 2d 950, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). However, “mental illness can fender violations of probation not willful and substantial.” Robinson v. State, 744 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (uns…
Authorities Cited
- Bingham v. State, 655 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Washington v. State, 667 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Rawlins v. State, 711 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)