HIP HEALTH PLAN OF FLORIDA, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
SANDI GRIFFIN, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DALE GRIFFIN, DECEASED, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF SAID ESTATE AND THE SURVIVORS THEREOF, RESPONDENTS

Fla. 4th DCA | 2000-05-24
No. 4D99-3891
STEVENSON and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
757 So. 2d 1272 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 11 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

HIP Health Plan sought a writ of prohibition to overturn a trial court's denial of its motion to disqualify the judge, claiming the judge exhibited bias. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the disqualification motion was untimely filed under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(e).


Holding

The motion was untimely under Rule 2.160(e). The word 'made' in the rule means 'filed,' not merely 'served,' consistent with how courts have interpreted similar language in other rules. Additionally, the motion was incomplete because it was not sworn and lacked a supporting affidavit at the time of service.


Headnotes

[1] A motion to disqualify a judge must be made within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the grounds for the motion.

[2] The timeliness of a motion to disqualify is determined by the date the motion is filed with the court, not the date it is served on opposing counsel.

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Key Quotes

“[a] motion to disqualify shall be made within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion and shall be promptly presented to the court for an immediate ruling.”

The controlling rule establishing the ten-day deadline for disqualification motions that the court interpreted to require filing rather than merely service.

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Facts & Procedural History

At a September 13, 1999 hearing, the trial judge made remarks that HIP believed reflected bias against it. On September 24, 1999, HIP filed a motion f…

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Opinion of the Court
WARNER, C.J.

WARNER, C.J.

Petitioner, HIP Health Plan, filed for a writ of prohibition, because the trial court denied its motion for disqualification. The court determined that the motion was untimely under rule 2.160(e) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. We agree and deny the petition.

HIP‘contends that at a hearing on September 13, 1999, the trial judge made remarks reflecting his bias against HIP. On September 24, 1999, HIP filed its motion for disqualification. According to the certificate of service, the motion was mailed on September 23, 1999,' ten days after the hearing. The motion recited counsel's certificate of good faith, but the motion did not contain a supporting affidavit and was not sworn. Instead, it recited that an affidavit, which was filed several days later, would be forthcoming.

Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(e) provides:

[a] motion to disqualify shall be made within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion and shall be promptly presented to the court for an immediate ruling.

(Emphasis added). HIP interprets “made” as requiring service within the ten day rule. Although no court has definitively addressed this issue as to what is meant by the rule’s reference to “making” a motion, numerous decisions have referred to the “filing” of the motion, rather than “service” of the motion, in discussing the timeliness of a motion. See, e.g., Carter v. Howey, 707 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. 6th DCA 1998); Guzman & Co. v. British Realty & Mortg. Corp., 699 So. 2d 842, 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Foley v. Fleet, 644 So. 2d 551, 551-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

The same language as is found in Rule 2.160 also appears in Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), which requires that “[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than 1 year after the judgment ... was entered.... ” (Emphasis added). In applying that time limit, courts have also referred to the rule as requiring “filing” within the one year period. See, e.g., Champion v. McDaniel, 740 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Huffman v. Huffman, 596 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Board of Pub. Instruction of Dade County v. Dinkines, 278 So:2d 663, 663-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). As the same language appears in both rules, it should be interpreted consistently. We therefore hold that the motion was untimely under the rule.

While in extraordinary circumstances some courts have allowed exceptions to the ten day rule, see, e.g., Brake v. Murphy, 693 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 700 So. 2d 686 (Fla.1997), no extraordinary circumstances are presented in this case. In addition, the motion was incomplete at the time it was served, as the motion was not sworn, nor was an affidavit filed attesting to the facts and reasons relied on for disqualification.

This rule may be a trap for the unwary, and it may be more fair to require service of a motion within ten days, as is required of most other pleadings under the rule. We would urge the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Judicial Administration to review the rule with regard to when the motion must be filed or served.

Finally, even if we were to ignore the technical and timing deficiencies of the motion, we would conclude that the motion was legally insufficient to require disqualification.

We therefore deny the petition.

STEVENSON and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • T/F Sys., Inc. v. Malt, 814 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …acts had occurred since October 18 which formed any other basis for recusal. The December 22 motion fell outside the 10 day time limit in rule 2.160(e). See Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 243 (Fla.1986); HIP Health Plan of Fla., Inc. v. Griffin, 757 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We therefore affirm that portion of the December 13, 2000 order fixing damages. The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was not based on any statute or rule of procedure.1 Rather, the court based its ruling on the “in…
  • Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Carter, 768 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
    …otion. Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is hereby denied. PETITION DENIED. BOOTH, ALLEN and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur. . We are unable to determine whether the motion was timely filed. See HIP Health Plan of Florida, Inc. v. Griffin, 757 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We find it unnecessary to reach this issue, however, in light of our denial of relief on other grounds.…
  • …ee’s proposed amendment to subdivision (e), Time, which resolves any ambiguity as to when the motion to disqualify must be filed or served by changing the word “made” in the first sentence to “filed.” See HIP Health Plan of Florida, Inc. v. Griffin, 757 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(not-ing that the use of the term “made” in rule 2.160, which has been interpreted to mean filed rather than served, “may be a trap for the unwary” and urging the Rules Committee to “review the rule with regard to when the m…

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