DIMARE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND ANTHONY SIMM DIMARE, APPELLANTS,
v.
BOB ROBERTSON AND MARY JO ROBERTSON, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial because the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
[1] A trial court has discretion to grant a new trial when a jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
[2] A jury verdict awarding past medical expenses but no damages for past pain and suffering may be considered inadequate, rather than technically inconsistent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA jury found the plaintiff did not suffer a permanent injury and awarded no noneconomic damages or loss of consortium damages, despite awarding past m…
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PER CURIAM.
DiMare, Inc. and Anthony DiMare appeal an order granting a new trial in a personal injury case. The jury found that plaintiff Bob Robertson had not suffered a permanent injury, and did not award any noneconomic damages or damages on Mary Jo Robertson’s claim for loss of consortium. The trial court ruled that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We perceive no abuse of discretion and affirm. See Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490 (Fla.1999).
Defendants-appellants DiMare, Inc. and Anthony DiMare argue that the order is erroneous because at one point it refers to the jury verdict as being inconsistent, yet there was no objection to the verdict as being inconsistent before the jury was discharged. Defendants say that any objection to the verdict on grounds of inconsistency was waived.
We reject defendants’ argument on this point.
The trial court used the term “inconsistent” in a colloquial sense, saying it was inconsistent for the jury to award $14,000 for past medical expenses, but nothing for past pain and suffering. In a technical sense, the court was describing an inadequate verdict. See Dolphin Cruise Line, Inc. v. Stassinopoulos, 731 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
There is no requirement to object to a verdict as being inadequate prior to the discharge of the jury. In any event, by its express terms and in substance, the new trial order is based on the court’s conclusion that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we see no basis on which to disturb the new trial order. Defendants also complain that in the course of its order, the court said that it anticipates at the new trial granting a directed verdict in favor of plaintiffs on the existence of a permanent injury. Defendants ask us to rule at this time on whether a directed verdict for plaintiffs would be proper at the second trial, assuming the evidence at the second trial is the same as the first trial.
We agree with plaintiffs that this issue is not ripe. We decline to address events which may or may not occur at the retrial of this case.
Affirmed.
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Ellender v. Bricker, 967 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…r filed a proper motion for additur or new trial raising the issue of inadequacy, and the fact that El-lender’s counsel referred to the verdict as inconsistent after the jury was discharged has no bearing on the issue. See DiMare, Inc. v. Robertson, 758 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (noting that although the trial court referred to verdict as inconsistent in a colloquial sense, it was technically describing an inadequate verdict); Avakian, 719 So. 2d at 344 (“Although Plaintiffs counsel referred to the…
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Francis-Harbin v. Sensormatic Elecs., LLC, 254 So. 3d 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…he plaintiff," id., the opinion also describes the verdict as "grossly inadequate." Id. A full reading of the opinion indicates that the court's reference to the award as "inconsistent" is more colloquial than anything else. See DiMare v. Robertson, 758 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Moreover, nowhere does Pickel conclude that the verdict was legally inconsistent. Indeed, the court's holding is premised not upon any legal inconsistency, but upon the grossly inadequate nature of a zero-damages verdict in light…
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Am. Sales & Mgmt. Org. LLC v. Lopez, 373 So. 3d 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)…lly cannot co-exist. And while a party must object to an inconsistent verdict prior to the discharge of the jury, “[t]here is no requirement to object to a verdict as being inadequate prior to the discharge of the jury.” DiMare, Inc. v. Robertson, 758 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). 2. Was the jury’s verdict legally inconsistent? We first address Rodriguez’s argument that the jury’s verdict was legally inconsistent. He contends that the jury’s verdict in favor of ASMO on the breach of fiduciary duty cl…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rupert B. Brown v. The Est. OF A.P. Stuckey, Sr., 749 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1999)
- Dolphin Cruise Line, Inc. v. Stylianos Stassinopoulos, 731 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)