JULIUS DOUGLAS, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 4th DCA | 2000-06-14
No. 4D00-1445
DELL and TAYLOR, JJ., concur., GROSS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
758 So. 2d 1285 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases
Topics
Discretion Of Trial Court Conflict Of Interest Statutory Construction Statutory Interpretation

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the trial court’s order of May 1, 2000 denying the public defender’s motion to withdraw. See Valle v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D260, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 60916 (Fla. 4th Jan. 26, 2000).

DELL and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. GROSS, J., concurs specially with opinion.

Concurrence
GROSS, J.,

GROSS, J.,

concurring specially.

I concur because I cannot distinguish this case from Valle v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D260, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 60916 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan.26, 2000), cited by the majority. In Valle, a witness/victim had been represented “from beginning to end” by the public defender’s office on two felonies, including charges of violation of community control; the most recent representation was a 1998 case. Id. at D260, at -. In this case, the public defender’s office represented the victim in a 1998 prosecution for public assistance fraud, wherein she pled guilty and was sentenced.

I believe that the amendment to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1999), was enacted to force closer scrutiny of the public defender’s assertion of a conflict of interest. The statute vests some discretion in the trial court to deny withdrawal where “the court determines that the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client.” On this record, absent Valle, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The discretion that section 27.53(3) intended to give a trial court has been limited by our rigid, overbroad application of language in Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla.1990), which mandates that a “public defender’s office is the functional equivalent of a law firm.” Our use of Bouie prevents a trial court from evaluating prejudice under section 27.53(3) from the standpoint of the assistant public defender representing a defendant, as opposed to the office as a whole. This issue may be ripe for reconsideration en banc.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Rodriguez v. State, 767 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …n the public defender alleged conflict and moved to withdraw, the court denied the motion and ordered her not to look at the files. We concluded the trial court should have granted the public defender’s motion to withdraw. See also Douglas v. State, 758 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(quashing the order of the trial court denying the public defender’s motion to withdraw when the public defender’s office represented the victim in a 1998 prosecution for public assistance fraud) and Bedford v. State, 765 So. 2d 8…
  • Moore v. State, 787 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
    …efender’s office is faced with a conflict of interest. See id.; see also Bedford v. State, 765 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(public defender’s prior representation of a victim created a conflict of interest warranting withdrawal); Douglas v. State, 758 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (quashing order of the trial court denying public defender’s motion to withdraw when the public defender’s office represented the victim in a 1998 prosecution for public assistance fraud). In this case, as in Valle, there clearl…
  • Hunter v. State, 765 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)

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