LEROY RICARDO LEVAN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed Levan's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal, holding that the statute creating the offense (chapter 95-182) violated the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution, as established in State v. Thompson.
Chapter 95-182 is unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule. Levan's conviction is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for any further proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.
[1] A statute is unconstitutional if it violates the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution.
[2] A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute based on the single subject rule may be raised for the first time on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Based on our decision in State v. Thompson, 750 So.2d 643 (Fla.1999), in which we held chapter 95-182 to be unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution, we quash the decision below, reverse Levan's conviction, and remand to the trial court for any further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”
Establishes the core holding that the statute is unconstitutional and the conviction must be reversed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeroy Ricardo Levan was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal and sentenced as a violent career criminal under ch…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review Levan v. State, 741 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), in which the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed Leroy Ricardo Levan’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal, as well as his sentence as a violent career criminal. In affirming the sentence, the Third District rejected Le-van’s challenge to chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, and certified conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).1 See Levan, 741 So. 2d at 612. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Based on our decision in State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1999), in which we held chapter 95-182 to be unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution, we quash the decision below, reverse Le-van’s conviction,2 and remand to the trial court for any further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. See McGowan v. State, 755 So. 2d 109 (Fla.2000).
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., dissents.
. The Third District did not indicate that Le-van failed to challenge chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, in the trial court. We find that such challenge may be properly addressed in this case for the first time on appeal. Cf. Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620, 623, 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950, 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
. Through the passage of chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, the Legislature created the possession of a firearm offense for which Le-van was convicted. See Ch. 95-182, § 7, at 1673 (creating section 790.235, Florida Statutes). Levan committed the offense on May 19, 1996, and he therefore has standing to raise a single subject rule challenge to chapter 95-182 even if the window period closed on October 1, 1996. Finally, although Levan challenges only his sentence-not his conviction-we sua sponte reverse his conviction because our decision in Thompson rendered the crime for which he was convicted non-existent during the applicable window period. Cf., e.g., Tape v. State, 661 So. 2d 1287, 1288-90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (reversing, sua sponte, defendant’s conviction for attempted first-degree felony murder because this Court’s decision in State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla.1995), rendered that offense non-existent).
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Wright v. State, 775 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…t career criminal based on State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1999). In Thompson, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, and thus rendered the unlawful possession charge a non-existent crime. See Levan v. State, 759 So. 2d 683 (Fla.2000) (noting that the offense of possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal was created through the passage of chapter 95-182). Accordingly, Wright’s conviction on count 3 for possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal must…
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Morris v. State, 772 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…Fla.1999). Ordinarily, we would be compelled to remand for resen-tencing. Id. However, although not argued by Morris, Thompson rendered the crime of possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal nonexistent on May 5, 1996. See Levan v. State, 759 So. 2d 683 (Fla.2000) (noting that the offense of possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal was created through the passage of chapter 95-182). Accordingly, Morris is entitled to have his conviction and sentence vacated. Id. The State concedes error…
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Lavon Jackson v. State, 778 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…agrees appellant has standing to raise a constitutional challenge to chapter 95-182, we, therefore, vacate the conviction and sentence and remand to the trial court for any further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. See Levan v. State, 759 So. 2d 683 (Fla.2000); McGowan v. State, 755 So. 2d 109 (Fla.2000). JOANOS, ALLEN and KAHN, JJ., CONCUR. . In McGowan v. State, 755 So. 2d 109, n. 2 (Fla.2000), the court held that a single subject challenge may be addressed for the first time on appeal.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Collin Gray, 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995)
- State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)
- Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1999)
- Carlton Bernard Tape v. State, 661 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- McGOWAN v. State, 755 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 2000)
- Levan v. State, 741 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)