JOSEPH COLLIGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
NORMA COLLIGAN, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2000-04-12
No. 3D99-1006
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GODERICH and RAMIREZ, JJ.
759 So. 2d 688 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Holding

An income deduction order under section 61.1301, Florida Statutes, cannot be used to secure payment of a property distribution award, as the statute is limited to alimony and child support.


Facts & Procedural History

The former husband appealed an income deduction order entered to secure a property distribution award. The appellate court had previously failed to ad…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In the final judgment on appeal, the court valued the assets awarded to the former husband at $592,904 and the assets awarded the wife at $194,030. The former husband was ordered to pay a total additional amount of $398,874 (the full difference between what he was awarded and what the wife was awarded) in order to accomplish equitable distribution. The judge specified that this was not intended as alimony. We conclude that the trial judge simply made a mathematical error by not first dividing the sum in half before awarding it to the wife. This is not an uncommon mistake. See Blythe v. Blythe, 592 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). In Blythe, after dividing the assets, the husband received $307,000.00, while the wife was awarded $142,000.00. The court stated,

In an attempt to equalize the distribution of assets in light of this award, the trial court awarded the wife lump sum alimony of $150,000.00. However, the trial court did not deduct this $150,000.00 from the husband’s total assets. Thus, the distribution resulted in the husband receiving twenty-eight percent (28%) of the net marital assets, while the wife received seventy-two percent (72%) of the net marital assets. The trial court did not justify this unequal treatment of the parties, nor is such a justification apparent from the record. It appears that this error may have been inadvertent.

Id. at 354-55.

We find that this is what occurred in the instant case and, therefore, reverse and remand for recalculation.

Upon remand, the trial court is free to reevaluate its prior ruling on alimony in light of the new distribution of assets.

Reversed and remanded.

Other

Appellant Joseph Colligan, the former husband, has moved for rehearing correctly pointing out that we failed to address in our opinion filed on April 12, 2000 the second issue he raised on appeal. That issue was that the trial court erred when it entered an income deduction order to secure the payment of a property distribution award. We grant rehearing and agree that such an order was improper, thus reversing on this point as well.

In Nash v. Nash, 688 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), reversing the entry of the income deduction order solely for the payment of attorney’s fees, we held that section 61.1301, Florida Statutes (1995), was in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. The First District addressed the very issue raised by the former husband in Board of Pension Trustees of City General Employees Pension Plan v. Vizcaino, 635 So. 2d 1012, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), stating that “section 61.1301 is expressly limited in its application to collection of either alimony and child support.” The court held that an income deduction order could not be entered for the purpose of effectuating the trial court’s plan for equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets, and we agree.

Therefore, in addition to the remand directions given in the April 12, 2000 opinion, we further direct the trial court on remand to vacate the income deduction order entered to secure the equitable distribution award. Should the court reconsider its prior alimony ruling as permitted under the April 12th opinion and decide to make an award of alimony, an income order may be entered to secure such award. Rehearing granted, reversed and remanded with directions.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Carollo v. Carollo, 920 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
    …a. 1st DCA 1994). Additionally, this Court has generally held that income deduction orders are not available to achieve an equitable distribution of marital assets. Silversmith v. Silversmith, 797 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Colligan v. Colligan, 759 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(recognizing that income deduction order pursuant to section 61.1301, Florida Statutes, is limited to collection of child support and alimony, and not appropriate to secure equitable distribution). In the instant case, section 40-…
  • …t be used to achieve equitable distribution of pension); Silversmith v. Silversmith, 797 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (income deduction order garnishing husband’s wages reversed when used to effectuate equitable distribution); Colligan v. Colligan, 759 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (income deduction order cannot be used to effectuate equitable distribution). This court has cited Vizcaino only tangentially, noting in one case that the order under review did not violate Vizcaino. See Abernethy v. Fishkin, 638…
  • Silversmith v. Silversmith, 797 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
    …ment through the central depository. It is well settled that an income deduction order may not be entered for purposes of effectuating the trial court’s plan for equitable distribution. See § 61.1301, Fla. Stat.(2000); see also Colligan v. Colligan, 759 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3DCA 2000); Nash v. Nash, 688 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Board of Pension Trustees of the City General Employees Pension Plan v. Vizcaino, 635 So. 2d 1012, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“[Sjection 61.1301 is expressly limited in its appli…

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