JENNIFER NEWSOM, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL L. NEWSOM, APPELLEE
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Jennifer Newsom challenged a trial court order modifying custody of the parties' minor child to award primary residential responsibility to the father. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by finding a substantial change in circumstances without adequate factual support for such modification.
The trial court abused its discretion by finding a substantial change in circumstances. Parental acrimony and the child's preference for less visitation with the mother, without more, do not constitute sufficient grounds for modifying an existing custody order. The court reversed and remanded for entry of an order denying the father's petition to modify custody.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion in modifying a custody order when the petitioner fails to plead and establish a substantial change in circumstances since the final ju…
[2] The fact that parents have an acrimonious relationship and cannot communicate does not, standing alone, constitute a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to war…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court's authority and discretion in a modification proceeding are more restricted than at the time of the initial custody determination.”
Establishes the heightened standard required in custody modification cases, limiting trial court discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties had shared parental responsibility since a 1987 final judgment, with the child residing equally with each parent. The father moved to modi…
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CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.
Jennifer Newsom, the appellant mother, challenges the trial court order granting primary residential responsibility of the parties’ minor daughter to Michael New-som, the appellee father. After a review of the record, we . conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the 1987 final judgment wherein the parties enjoyed shared parental responsibüity. We therefore reverse.
In his motion to modify custody, the father alleges that the current custody scheme wherein the child resides .with each parent an equal amount of time is disruptive to the chüd’s lifestyle; that the child desires less visitation with the mother; and thát primary residential responsibility with the father is in the child’s best interests. This is insufficient standing alone to establish a sufficient change in circumstances so as to justify modification of an existing custody order. A trial court’s authority and discretion in a modification proceeding are more restricted than at the time of the initial custody determination. See Blosser v. Blosser, 707 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In considering a modification of custody, the petitioner must plead and establish that circumstances have substantially changed since the final judgment; and that the change has such an important impact on the chüd that the court is justified in imposing a change of custody in the best interests of the child. See Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
In this case, we cannot conclude that there has been such a substantial change in circumstances as to warrant modification. While it is undisputed that the father and mother have a very acrimonious relationship, it was noted by the trial court that both are intelligent individuals who love their chüd and are concerned about her welfare. Even the guardian, while recommending that the father have primary residential responsibility, noted in his report that the father and stepmother have actively avoided attempts at co-parenting, while the mother has demonstrated a consistent attempt at co-parenting. While the trial court stated that it considered all of the elements of section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1997), and found that there had been a substantial change in circumstances warranting a change in primary residential custody, we cannot agree based on the record before us. The fact that the parents cannot communicate and get along does not constitute a material change in circumstances to warrant modification of custody. See Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Accordingly, we reverse the final order and remand for entry of an order denying the father’s petition.
Reversed and remanded.
SALCINES, J., and DANAHY, PAUL W., (Senior) Judge, Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (17 total)
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Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2005)…interest of the child. Res judicata attached to that determination and that determination cannot be modified without satisfying the substantial change test. See, e.g., Belford v. Belford, 159 Fla. 547, 32 So. 2d 312 (1947); [*935] Newsom v. Newsom, 759 So. 2d 718, 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Y. The Trial Court’s Decision Having determined that the substantial change test applies to modifications of rotating custody, we now review the order of the trial c…
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Cooper v. Gress, 854 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…uestion of law. See Gilliam v. Smart, 809 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Clearly* “[a] trial court’s authority and discretion in a modification proceeding are more restricted than at the time of the initial custody determination.” Newsom v. Newsom, 759 So. 2d 718, 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Young v. Young, 732 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Jablon v. Jablon, 579 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So. 2d 1034, 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (describing movant’s “extraordinary burden” to satisfy “…
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Ring v. Ring, 834 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…nces as to the other three children or that a change in custody was in their best interest. The record does show that the parties in this case sadly failed to communicate between themselves and had continuing hostility. However, in Newsom v. Newsom, 759 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), this court stated that the “fact that the parents cannot communicate and get along does not constitute a material change in circumstances to warrant modification of custody.” As the father has conceded that A.R. is exclude…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Karie Lynn Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Charlana M. Blosser v. Blosser, 707 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)