IN RE ESTATE OF LAWRENCE LYNN DELLINGER, DECEASED. SUSAN LEVY, APPELLANT,
v.
FRANCIS H. DELLINGER, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, APPELLEE
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In an estate dispute, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's determination that a decedent's IRA should pass to his estate rather than to his ex-spouse, Susan Levy, who remained named as beneficiary after their divorce. The court held that the plain language of the IRA beneficiary designation controlled, making Levy the rightful beneficiary.
The court held that Susan Levy was the rightful beneficiary of the IRA. Where a separation agreement does not address IRA proceeds, courts should look to the plain language of the policy to determine the decedent's intent, and Levy's identity as the named beneficiary 'Susan L. Dellinger, spouse' made her entitled to the proceeds.
[1] Where a separation agreement does not address IRA proceeds, the plain language of the IRA beneficiary designation controls.
[2] A former spouse remains the designated beneficiary of an IRA if the beneficiary designation uses her name and does not rely on a marital relationship that has since termi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where a separation agreement does not include IRA proceeds, courts 'need look no further than the plain language of the policy' to determine who the decedent intended as beneficiary of the proceeds.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that plain language of the IRA beneficiary designation is dispositive when a separation agreement does not address IRA proceeds.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn May 1993, a retired pilot aged 57 established an IRA naming 'Susan L. Dellinger, spouse' as primary beneficiary. Six months later, the decedent and…
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GLICKSTEIN, HUGH S., Senior Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment determining the estate to be the beneficiary of the decedent’s IRA. We reverse.
In May, 1993, the decedent, a retired pilot, then 57, applied for an IRA, naming “Susan L. Dellinger, spouse” as the primary beneficiary. Six months later, decedent and appellant were divorced, whereby appellant’s former name, Susan A. Levy, was restored to her. In July, 1998, the decedent passed away.
In the dissolution, according to the pleadings, the parties’ so-called property division was nothing more than dividing vehicles and personal items and dividing the debts, which totaled about $70,000.
There are no sworn pleadings, affidavits or testimony under oath relating to the merits. The amended petition to determine beneficiaries’ entitlement to property attaches the IRA application and the decedent’s 1997 will, leaving his estate to the trustees of the decedent’s revocable living trust. The decedent’s brother is the personal representative and successor trustee, according to the unsigned trust document attached to the amended petition.
In 1999, the trial court first entered an order, denying appellant’s motion to dismiss the amended petition and holding the estate to be the rightful beneficiary of the IRA, citing Leonard v. Crocker, 661 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), rev. denied, 670 So. 2d 938 (Fla.1996), and Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 So. 2d 77 (Fla.1996). It then entered final judgment.
We hold that the trial court erred in determining the estate to be the beneficiary of the decedent’s IRA. Where a separation agreement does not include IRA proceeds, courts “need look no further than the plain language of the policy” to determine who the decedent intended as beneficiary of the proceeds. Cooper, 682 So. 2d at 78. Here, the record shows that the IRA listed “Susan L. Dellinger, spouse” as the beneficiary. It is undisputed that appellant and “Susan L. Dellinger, spouse” are the same person. Thus, we hold that appellant was the rightful beneficiary of the decedent’s IRA. Appellee, however, argues that we should affirm pursuant to Crocker. We disagree. The court in Crocker based its decision on a specific adoption statute that provides a judgment of adoption,
terminates all legal relationships between the adopted person and his relatives ... so that the adopted person is a stranger to his or her former relatives for all purposes, including inheritance and the interpretation or construction of documents, statutes, and instruments ... that do not expressly include the adopted person by name or by some designation not based on a parent and child or blood relationship.
Crocker, 661 So. 2d at 1244 (citing § 63.172, Fla. Stat. (1993)) (emphasis added). As such, and under the facts of this case, we do not find Crocker applicable.
WARNER, C.J., and STONE, J„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Crawford v. Jannie Barker, 64 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2011)…and accounts other than life insurance policies. See Smith v. Smith, 919 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (individual retirement account (IRA) and annuity accounts); Luszcz v. Lavoie, 787 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (IRA); In re Estate of Dellinger, 760 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (IRA); Waller v. Pope, 715 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (employee pension plan and [*1253] credit union account). This is a logical extension of the rule announced in Cooper II, because an IRA, an annuity account, and an employe…
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Luszcz v. Lavoie, 787 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…awarded in a dissolution of marriage. Because an IRA is a contract with an institution, not with a spouse, this holding applies regardless of whether the parties to the dissolution have executed releases. We note that in In re Estate of Dellinger, 760 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the Fourth District was faced with a situation identical to that in Cooper except that an IRA rather than an insurance policy was involved. The court held that “[w]here a separation agreement does not include IRA proceeds, court…
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Smith v. Smith, 919 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…decedent never changed the beneficiary designations. Under these circumstances, courts “need look no further than the plain language of the policy” to determine who the decedent intended as beneficiary of the proceeds. See In re Estate of Dellinger, 760 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). A pension plan benefit or credit union savings account where an ex-spouse is listed as a beneficiary and where the beneficiary remains unchanged would be treated in a similar manner, even where the settlement agreement provides…
Authorities Cited
- Cooper v. Karin Muccitelli, 682 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1996)
- Leonard v. Crocker, 661 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)