STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JANICE HURLEY, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the trial court's discharge of Hurley based on a speedy trial violation. The court affirmed, holding that Hurley was arrested on December 22, 1997, when police took her into custody, informed her of the arrest, and subjected her to interrogation, and the subsequent 19-month delay before filing charges violated Florida's speedy trial rule.
Hurley was arrested on December 22, 1997, because police officers informed her she was being arrested and their actions were consistent with that announcement, meeting all elements of the legal definition of arrest. The 19-month delay between arrest and the filing of the information on July 2, 1999, exceeded the 175-day speedy trial period and warranted discharge.
[1] An arrest requires a purpose to arrest under authority, seizure or detention of the person, communication of intent to arrest, and understanding by the person that they a…
[2] A detention involving being told of an arrest, handcuffed, placed in a police car, and taken to a police station constitutes an arrest.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When used in this sense, an arrest involves the following elements: (1) A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested by a person having present power to control the person arrested; (3) A communication by the arresting officer to the person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him.”
Establishes the four-element legal definition of arrest that the court applied to determine Hurley was arrested on December 22, 1997.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn December 22, 1997, police officers arrested Hurley at work for forging checks and embezzling money, handcuffed her, transported her to the police s…
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PETERSON, J., Associate Judge.
The State of Florida appeals an order discharging Janice Hurley because her right to a speedy trial was violated. We affirm.
On December 22, 1997, Hurley was approached at work by a police detective and uniformed police officers who told her that she was being arrested for forging checks and embezzling money from her employer. The officers confiscated her purse, placed her in the back of a police car after handcuffing her, and drove her to the police station where she was placed in a holding cell for 45 minutes to an hour before she was interrogated.
During the one and one-half hour audio-taped interrogatories, she was again informed that she was being arrested and asked if she would like her daughter to take her personal belongings. At the end of the interrogation, Hurley was released without being fingerprinted or booked.
More than a year later, on July 2, 1999, the State filed an information against Hurley charging her with the same grand theft charge for which she was taken into custody on December 22, 1997. She filed a motion for discharge which was granted by the trial court.
The State argues that Hurley was not arrested on December 22, 1997, but was simply subjected to an involuntary custodial interrogation citing, State v. Lail, 687 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); State v. Christian, 442 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); and Snead v. State, 346 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). We find those cases to have involved involuntary custodial interrogatories with no statements that the defendants were being arrested; therefore, they are inapplicable. In the instant case, Hurley was told from the onset that she was being arrested and the police officers’ actions were consistent with their announcement. The officers’ actions were also consistent with the definition of arrest found in Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla.1954):
When used in this sense, an arrest involves the following elements: (1) A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested by a person having present power to control the person arrested; (3) A communication by the arresting officer to the person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him.
The facts surrounding Hurley’s detention meet the supreme court’s definition of an arrest and the trial court properly found that she was arrested on December 22, 1997. Speedy trial calculation begins on the date of the original arrest. See Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, she was properly discharged since the time between the 1997 arrest and the 1999 information clearly exceeded the 175 days prescribed by Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a).
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH and W. SHARP, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Born-Suniaga v. State, 256 So. 3d 783 (Fla. 2018)…ecedent does not apply to the facts of this case because the State charged Born-Suniaga within 175 days of his initial arrest. Genden v. Fuller , 648 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1994) ; Pearson v. State , 18 So. 3d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ; State v. Hurley , 760 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Williams v. State , 946 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ; Von Waldner v. State , 860 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Griggs v. State , 994 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Reed v. State , 649 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1995) ; Trainer…
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Mumani v. State, 63 So. 3d 923 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…ion of Speedy trial. The court subsequently entered an order, determining that Mumani was not entitled to invoke speedy trial because he had not yet been arrested for the offense. The trial court misapplied [*924] this Court’s case, State v. Hurley, 760 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), to support its determination. At issue in Hurley was rule 3.191(a) (Speedy Trial without Demand), which provides that the time periods under the speedy trial rule commence upon the person being “arrested” if the crime charged…
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State v. Archer, 902 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. Hurley, 760 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). PETERSON, GRIFFIN and PLEUS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1985)
- Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954)
- Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Snead v. State, 346 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Toyota Motor Sales v. Ortiz, 442 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- State v. Christian, 442 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- State v. Lail, 687 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)