STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
JOSEPH M. DAMICO, RESPONDENT
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Florida Supreme Court quashed the Second District's decision invalidating the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act and remanded for resentencing, but allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because he relied on the Act's unconstitutionality when entering it.
The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate separation of powers or other constitutional provisions, and a defendant who entered a guilty plea based on the understanding that the Act would not apply may withdraw that plea upon remand.
[1] A defendant who enters a guilty plea based on the understanding that a subsequently invalidated statute will not apply is entitled to withdraw that plea upon remand, even…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because it appears that the respondent entered a plea of guilty with the understanding that respondent, upon such plea, would not be sentenced pursuant to the Act, upon remand to the trial court, respondent shall have the right to withdraw his guilty plea.”
The Court's disposition regarding the defendant's remedy upon remand.
Joseph M. Damico entered a guilty plea with the understanding that he would not be sentenced under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. The Second Dist…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in State v. Damico, 742 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which the district court certified to be in conflict with the opinion in Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We recently approved the First District’s decision in Woods, holding that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, as properly interpreted by the First District, does not violate separation of powers, and rejecting other constitutional challenges to the Act. See State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 & SC95281, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000). Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in Cotton, we quash the Second District’s decision in this case, and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in Cotton. Because it appears that the respondent entered a plea of guilty with the understanding that respondent, upon such plea, would not be sentenced pursuant to the Act, upon remand to the trial court, respondent shall have the right to withdraw his guilty plea.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
QUINCE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 & SC95281, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- State v. Burthland Forde, 742 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- State v. Damico, 742 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)